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The Internet is comprised of entities. These entities are called Autonomous Systems 
(ASes). Each one of these ASes is managed by an Internet Service Provider (ISP). In return 
each group of ISPs are managed by Regional Internet Registry (RIR). Finally, all RIRs are 
managed by Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA).  
The different ASes are globally connected via the inter-domain protocol that is Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP).  
BGP was designed to be scalable to handle the massive Internet traffic; however, it has 
been studied for improvements for its lack of security. Furthermore, it relies on Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) which, in return, makes BGP vulnerable to whatever attacks TCP is 
vulnerable to. Thus, many researchers have worked on developing proposals for improving 
BGP security, due to the fact that it is the only external protocol connecting the ASes around 
the globe.  
In this thesis, different security proposals are reviewed and discussed for their merits and 
drawbacks. With the aid of Artificial Immune Systems (AIS), the research reported in this 
thesis addresses Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) and message replay attacks. Other attacks are 
discussed regarding the benefits of using AIS to support BGP; however, the focus is on 
MITM and message replay attacks.  This thesis reports on the evaluation of a novel Hybrid 
AIS model compared with existing methods of securing BGP such as S-BGP and BGPsec as 
well as the traditional Negative Selection AIS algorithm. The results demonstrate improved 
precision of detecting attacks for the Hybrid AIS model compared with the Negative 
Selection AIS. Higher precision was achieved with S-BGP and BGPsec, however, at the cost 
of higher end-to-end delays. The high precision shown in the collected results for S-BGP and 
BGPsec is largely due to S-BGP encrypting the data by using public key infrastructure, while 
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BGPsec utilises IPsec security suit to encapsulate the exchanged BGP packets. Therefore, 
neither of the two methods (S-BGP and BGPsec) are considered as Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS). Furthermore, S-BGP and BGPsec lack in the decision making and require 
administrative attention to mitigate an intrusion or cyberattack. While on the other hand, the 
suggested Hybrid AIS can remap the network topology depending on the need and optimise 
the path to the destination.  
 
Keywords: Border Gateway Protocol, BGP, Artificial Immune Systems, AIS, Transmission 
Control Protocol, TCP, IPsec, Encryption, message digest, MD5, Hashing function, Network 
Security, Machine Learning.  
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This thesis is ultimately based on the experimental apparatus and data of Riverbed 
modeller (formerly known as OPNET Modeler) and OMNET++ modeler. None of the text of 
the dissertation is taken directly from previously published or collaborative articles. 
The Simulation design in chapter 4 was done primarily by me, with the aid of using features 
and different modules of OPNET modeler. The data analysis and evaluation in chapter 5 was 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter is discussing the problem scope for BGP security which leads to stating the 
research question. Then next section states the aims and objectives for this thesis in order to 
answer the research question stated.  
 
 
1.1 Brief survey of the problem 
 
The Internet infrastructure is divided into several logical zones. These zones are 
Autonomous Systems (ASes) (RFC 1105, 1163, 1267 1654, 1771, 4271). Each AS is 
identified by a number (ASN), which is issued by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA).  
A single AS can be defined as a group of routers (two or more) governed by the same 
administration so that all the routers follow the same routing policies. Generally, ASes are 
controlled by Internet Service Providers (ISPs). ISPs are in return grouped to an Organisation 
(i.e., Regional Internet Registry (RIR)) and they are managed by IANA. Figure 1 shows the 












ISP ISP ISP ISP 
Figure 1. Internet Infrastructure. 
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According to IANA (IANA 2012), there are more than four billion ASes around the 
world; and the only protocol that is used to carry traffic between these ASes is the Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP).  
BGP was firstly developed by the Inter-Domain Routing Working Group of the Internet 
Engineering Task force (IETF). BGP was inspired from the obsolete protocol, Exterior 
Gateway Protocol (EGP), facilitating transferring routing information between Autonomous 
Systems (AS). 
BGP is considered the backbone of the Internet infrastructure. During its development, 
BGP was initially designed to rely on a reliable transport protocol  such as Versatile Message 
Transaction Protocol (VMTP) and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) (Lougheed and 
Rekhter 1989). Eventually, the IETF opted for TCP mainly for the following reasons: 
1- TCP is commercialised and is available in almost all network devices. 
2- TCP being a connection-oriented protocol, supports fragmentation, acknowledgement, 
retransmission and sequencing; therefore, BGP need not to provide its own and can 
instead use those facilities provided by TCP. Figure 2 shows the TCP/IP model layers 
in which all the Internet protocols are fallen under.  
3- Being the only external routing protocol, BGP could use further features of the 
TCP/IP Protocol Suite such as IPsec, which can help address confidentiality and 













Figure 2. TCP/IP model layers. 
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BGP uses TCP port 179 for establishing sessions between peers. BGP peers are either 
internal neighbours (both belong to the same AS) or external neighbours (each belong to 
different AS). 
 Thus, there are two variants of BGP:  
 Internal BGP (iBGP) - this is implemented within a single AS (intra-domain) to 
exchange information between the routers of that AS
1
.  
 External BGP (eBGP) – (hereafter referred to as BGP) this is implemented between 
ASes; this protocol is the only protocol that is scalable enough to handle the large 
volumes of Internet traffic associated with inter-AS communication.  
However, BGP was designed (starting from version 1 all the way to version 4 and 
BGPsec) to be embedded within TCP, thus, making BGP prone to attacks and security 
breaches that can be directed toward TCP, including broad threat types such as TCP reset 
attack, Denial of Service (DoS), Man-In-The-Middle (MITM), etc. In addition to TCP 
attacks, BGP has its own vulnerabilities that can lead to communication disruption or loss of 
routing information, such as session hijacking, the BGP “wedgie” attack, route damping, and 
so on.  Collectively, these issues present challenges to the effective operation of BGP and 
form the focus area for this research project. These issues and the proposed countermeasures 
will be discussed further in detail in chapter two.  
During the period of reviewing the existing literature, it was found that Artificial Immune 
Systems (AIS) are being used as a detection and prediction system, such as network 
misbehaviour detection (Balachandran et al. 2006) and (Sarafijanović and Le Boudec 2004). 
Furthermore, AIS was used for bankruptcy prediction (Singh and Sengupta 2007). AIS was 
found adaptive to inconsistent set of data, which makes it more dynamic and constantly 
                                                 
1
 iBGP is rarely used nowadays, because of the complicated topology design where each router should be 
connected to all other routers within a single AS. Therefore, alternatives were found that work efficiently such 
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evolving by producing smarter set of detectors (more details in section 002.5.2 Artificial 
Immune Systems (AIS)). The ability of producing detectors and evolving to next generations 
of smarter (more mature) detectors can help with mitigating MITM and Message Replay 
attacks due to the ability of network mapping.  Therefore, this research is focusing on 
applying AIS to BGP as detection system in order to detect and resolve attacks disruptions.  
Therefore, this thesis addresses the following research question: 
 
In order to satisfy the above question, this project will be divided into two initial 
simulation phases; each of these phases includes a security algorithm which will be simulated 
and tested in Riverbed Modeler (formerly known as OPNET modeler). Eventually after 
finishing the development of the second initial simulation phase (message replay phase) the 
project will combine the two developed algorithms of both phases and compare them with 
Negative Selection AIS, S-BGP and BGPsec using OMNET++ modeler. 
 
1.2 Aims 
The aims of this project are: 
1. Authenticate the address of the sender of BGP packets by using AIS to detect MITM 
attack by utilising network topology mapping via adjacent routers’ address versus AS 
path variable in the packets.  
2. Prevent MITM attacks in BGP networks using AIS, by registering triggered attacks in 
records, thus preventing a malicious packet from being processed. 
How can AIS improve the security for BGPv4 with respect to authentication and 
verification? 
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3. Verify BGP packet content using AIS to detect Message Replay attack, by registering 
false positive advertisement of packets (more details in chapter 3).  
4. Prevent Message Replay attacks in BGP networks using AIS to record the sender’s 
details versus the message contents. 
5. Remap BGP networks to avoid passage of messages and network communications 
through suspected network nodes. 
 
1.3 Objectives 
The objectives of this thesis are summarised as follows: 
 Explore the security issues of BGP 
 Review the security drawbacks of BGP, these issues and the proposed 
countermeasures will be discussed in detail in chapter two 
 Develop an AIS algorithm to protect against MITM 
 Develop a simulation prototype for the aforementioned algorithm 
 Test and evaluate the designed simulation prototype 
 Develop an AIS algorithm to detect message replay  
 Develop a simulation prototype to test and evaluate the algorithm 
For the project to achieve the required objectives, it goes through the following logical 
procedure:  
 Explore the related publications to BGP and AIS  
 Investigate the security problems and proposed solutions for BGP  
 Develop a simulation prototype to test the MITM using OPNET simulator  
 Explore the methods and tools used in this project  
 Test and evaluation of collected results  
 Develop a simulation prototype to test the algorithm for message replay 
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 Test and evaluation  
 
Reflecting on the aforementioned Aims, the original Contribution to Knowledge of 
this research is a simulation of an economical (no third party required) and adaptable (able to 
cope with network expansion) security approach by authenticating the source of packets and 
verification of their contents to detect and prevent MITM and Message Replay respectively; 
in addition to preventing these attacks, the speed of packet transmission for multi-homed 
routers of BGP network remains unaffected due to the AIS processing node being placed 
outside BGP node, thus releasing the resources allocated for BGP while AIS is processing the 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter discusses the main security issues of BGP. Followed by the evolution of 
BGP leading it to the latest version and how it improves security aspects. Finally, section 2.5 
gives a brief description of machine learning specifically Adaptive Neural Networks and 
Artificial Immune Systems. 
 
2.1 Evolution of Border Gateway Protocol 
 
In order to cope with the growth of the global network, BGP had to go through different 
versions, which helped in developing the protocol used nowadays.  
Like any other protocol, BGP started with basic functionalities that need to be tested in 
order to spot the weaknesses and work on developing them. Therefore, starting in BGPv1 this 
section will be an introduction of “How BGP initially operates?” as well as “How it was 
basically designed? and why?”. 
Leading to BGPv2, this section will include the updates of BGPv2 over the previous one, 
focusing on the main reasons behind these modifications. 
Next, BGPv3 same as in previous section; however, in this version BGP started to be 
more stable hence lesser modifications. 
Finally, BGPv4 (the latest version), this section will describe the main modifications over 
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2.1.1 BGPv1 [RFC 1105] 
 
In order to communicate, BGP needs to exchange messages that work on transferring 
routing information, maintaining the session or notifying whenever an error occurs. BGPv1 
started with having five messages, which are:  
1. OPEN. 




BGP adds a fixed size header (eight bytes) for every outgoing message, Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. BGP header (RFC 1105). 
 
Marker field – it is used to determine the start of a BGP message by having both bytes set 
to all ones. In case of not having the stated value, there would be a synchronisation error, 
resulting in sending a notification message including the field and terminating BGP 
connection afterwards.  
Length field – this is set to the value of the length of the entire message including the 
header (in bytes). In case of a wrong length value (i.e., more than 1024 or less than 8 bytes), a 
notification message would be sent along with the field followed by session closure.   
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Version field – it includes the version of the protocol in use. Currently, there are four 
versions of BGP (RFC4271), BGPv4 being the most recent and frequently used by Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs).  
Type field – it indicates the type of message attached to this header. 
 Hold Time field – it contains a number (representing the seconds) that the receiver must 
wait for before closing the connection. Unless a KEEPALIVE or UPDATE message was 
received before the time elapse then in this case the connection remains.  
The content and format of BGPv1 OPEN message is shown in Figure 4. My Autonomous 
System field represents the 16-bit or 32-bit AS number.  
                      
 
Figure 4. BGPv1 OPEN message format (RFC 1105). 
 
Link Type field – it includes one byte that could be set to any value of the following: 
(Figure 5.) 
0- INTERNAL (indicates that the message received is from a BGP router that belongs to 
the same AS). 
1- UP (indicates that the message received is from BGP peer higher than the receiver in 
the AS hierarchy). 
2- DOWN (an indication that the message was received from a BGP router positioned 
lower in the AS hierarchy). 
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3- H-LINK (when the message was received from a BGP router that is on the same level 











Authentication Code – setting this field to a value of zero will indicate no application of 
an authentication within BGP. However, and due to, having BGP installed on top of a reliable 
transport protocol, any authentication method deployed for that transport protocol should be 
applicable for authenticating BGP messages. 
Authentication Data field – this will indicate the type of authentication implemented for 
the exchanged BGP messages during a specific session. In order to have a value in this field, 
the Authentication Code field should have a value other than zero; otherwise, the length of 
Authentication Data field would be set to zero.   
After receiving an OPEN message, the BGP system will respond back with an OPEN 
CONFIRM message, and it is considered the last step of BGP connection setup. The format 
of OPEN CONFIRM message is a BGP header with the type value set to OPEN CONFIRM. 





AS 1 AS 2 
AS 3 
Figure 5. BGPv1 Link Type attribute. 
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OPEN CONFIRM, UPDATE or KEEPALIVE messages could be exchanged to maintain the 
connection.   
BGP compliant systems may exchange UPDATE messages which contain detailed 
routing information; therefore, BGP UPDATE messages would help to draw the topology of 
the AS’s network. The format of the UPDATE message is shown in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6. BGPv1 UPDATE message format (RFC 1105). 
 
Gateway – it is a four bytes field that contains the address of the designated router which 
serves as a connection to the Internet network. This designated router should have the routes 
that the UPDATE message should follow. Furthermore, the designated router should belong 
to the same AS as the router that initiated the UPDATE message.  
AS COUNT Field – it contains the number of pairs of Direction and AS number entries in 
this UPDATE message. Where Direction could be set to one of the following values: 
1. UP   (went up a link in the graph) 
2. DOWN  (went down a link in the graph) 
3. H_LINK  (horizontal link in the graph) 
4. EGP_LINK  (EGP derived information) 
5. INCOMPLETE (incomplete information) 
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The values given to DIRECTION field indicate the direction that the UPDATE message 













DIRECTION also includes special cases of an UPDATE message being either 
sent/received from Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) or sent/received from another routing 
protocol such as OSPF, RIP etc. In case of EGP, the direction will be set to the appropriate 
value, and the AS NUMBER field will be set to the one of EGP. Whereas in case of the other 
routing protocols, direction will be set to incomplete, and AS NUMBER will be set to zero as 
the AS concept is only used in BGP and the obsoleted EGP (RFC 1105).    
NET COUNT – it is a field that contains the number of NETWORK and METRIC pairs. 
NETWORK – this field contains the IP addresses of routers that the UPDATE message 
should pass through.  
METRIC – it is a field used for comparison with other UPDATE message metrics, 












OSPF, RIP, IEGRP, 
etc. 
Figure 7. BGPv1 UPDATE Direction. 
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could be used to indicate unreachable destinations when set to all ones; other values are 
meaningless as there is no wrong value to be given.  
The next message that BGPv1 exchanges, is NOTIFICATION. This message is only sent 
when an error occurs whether during the connection setup or later steps. Shortly after sending 
the NOTIFICATION message, BGP would terminate the connection; the format of this 
message is shown in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8. BGPv1 NOTIFICATION message format (RFC 1105). 
 
OpCode field includes the error code; this would help identify the error type.  The 
possible codes are shown in Table1. 
2
Table 1. BGPv1 OPCODE types. 
                                                 
** The update error considered not fatal error; unlike the other errors where upon receipt, the connection 
would be terminated.  
CODE ERROR TYPE DATA FIELD 
1 Link type error in open Data is one byte of proper link type. 
2 Unknown authentication code No data. 
3 Authentication failure No data. 
**4 Update error See below for data description. 
5 Connection out of sync No data. 
6 Invalid message length Data is two bytes of bad length. 
7 Invalid message type Data is one byte of bad message type. 
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For all the error codes except the UPDATE error, those are considered as fatal error, this 
in return leads to connection termination.  
On the other hand, OpCode 4 (UPDATE ERROR) will include two bytes of data attached 
to it, due to the importance of UPDATE message. This data field will include a sub-code 
referring to the specific field within the UPDATE message that is causing the problem. In 
addition to the sub-code, data field will include as much as possible of the aforementioned 
UPDATE message. The possible sub-code values are: 
1 - Invalid AS count 
2 - Invalid direction code 
3 - Invalid autonomous system 
4 - EGP_LINK or INCOMPLETE_LINK link type at the other end of the AS path list 
5 - Routing loop 
6 - Invalid gateway field 
7 - Invalid Net Count field 
8 - Invalid network field 
The last message that BGPv1 exchanges, is KEEPALIVE. The main purpose of this 
message is to maintain the connection. Due to having Hold Time within BGPv1 message 
header, KEEPALIVE might be exchanged every one third of the total hold timer (depending 
on the configuration). This will determine the peer’s reachability. Therefore, this message 
does not include a data field.   
8 Invalid version number Data is one byte of bad version. 
9 Invalid AS field in OPEN No data. 
10 BGP Cease No data. 
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Finally, BGPv1 operation could be illustrated by the following Finite State Machine 

































Sending Open message to neighbours 
Open Confirm message sent 
Open Confirm message received 
BGP_IDLE 
Acquiring neighbours/ TCP connection 
BGP_ACTIVE 
Stop by system or 
operator, Notification 
received or Hold 
Timer expired 















Figure 9. BGPv1 Finite State Machine. 
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2.1.2 BGPv2 [RFC 1163] 
 
BGPv2 is an improved version of BGPv1 as some of the unnecessary features of the 
protocol have been removed to make it more efficient. A summary of the changes is 
illustrated in Table 2.   
Table 2. Summary of improvements of BGPv2 over BGPv1. 
FIELD FUNCTION IN BGPv1 PLACE IN BGPv2 
H-Link, Up, 
Down 
To determine the direction that the 
message should follow 
Removed from the protocol 
Hold Time Was in the header, works as an 
expiry test of the connection  
Replaced into the OPEN message, 
performing the same function 
Version Was in the header, works on 
identifying the sender’s protocol 
version 
Replaced into the OPEN message, 




As a response to confirm the receipt 
of OPEN message 
Replaced with an implicit response 
using KEEPALIVE message 
Marker In the message header, it was 
working on confirming the 
synchronisation if set to all ones 
The function expanded, and it will 
be described in detail 
UPDATE 
message 
Used to exchange routing 
information 
This message changed significantly, 
and will be described in detail 
 
 
For the MARKER field in BGPv2; its role and size have expanded. The size became 16 
bytes instead of being two only; this will make the header fixed size to be 19 bytes instead of 
8 bytes in BGPv1, Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. BGPv2 message header format (RFC 1163). 
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The expansion in size was due to the extended complexity, where the marker field could 
work as BGP authentication technique. In order to provide authenticity, complicated 
computations need to be performed for this specific field. 
 In a special case the marker field would be set to all ones, this occurs whenever the 
Authentication code was set to zero in the OPEN message. In addition to the Authentication 
mechanism, MARKER could still be used to detect loss of synchronisation between peers.  
On the other hand, UPDATE message was extensively restructured. The message format 
is shown in Figure. 
 
 
Figure 11. BGPv2 UPDATE message format (RFC 1163). 
 
Total Path Attributes Length is a two bytes field. This will contain the total length in 
bytes for the next field (i.e., Path Attributes). Furthermore, the same field should correlate to 
the number of Networks (the third field), this will be described later.   
Path Attributes field is a variable length. This field itself is divided into three sub-fields, 
which are <attribute type, attribute length, attribute value>. Attribute type is a two bytes field 
that in return is sub-divided into two sub-fields. The first sub-field (first byte) is the Attribute 
Flags; whereas the second byte is the Attribute Type Code (Figure 12). 






           








 The second byte of the Attribute Type is the Attribute Type Code. This field would help 
recognising the type of attribute attached and based on that the BGP router will take the 







Unused must be kept zero 
Optional bit determines whether the attribute is Optional (when set to 1) or Well-Known. 
Transitive bit determines whether the attribute is Optional Transitive (if set to 1) or 
Optional non-transitive (if set to 0). For Well-known, this bit should be set to one. 
Partial bit determines whether the data in Optional transitive attribute is partial (if 1) 
or complete (if 0), for Optional non-transitive and Well-known this bit must be set to 
zero. Extended bit determines whether the attribute length is one byte (when set to 
zero), or the attribute length referring to more than 255 PATH ATTRIBUTES. 
0      1    2     3     4     5      6      7    8    9    10    11   12    13    14     15 
Attribute Type Code this will include the code of the attribute type Figure 13. 
Figure 12. Attribute Flags. 



















Starting with the Well-Known Mandatory, which means that the attribute (of this type) 
must be present in all UPDATE messages and all BGP compliant routers should recognise it. 
AS-PATH will include the number of ASes that the UPDATE message should pass through 
in order to reach the destined network. The reason for setting this field length to variable is 
due to the two bytes field in the OPEN message (MY Autonomous System); thus, AS-PATH 
length would be twice the number of ASes of the path. 
BGP Origin will determine the relative position of the sender with respect to the receiver. 
Therefore, this field will include three possible values as shown in Table 3.  
Type Code: 1 
Length: 1 byte 
 
 
Type Code: 2 
Length: variable 
 
Type Code: 4 




Type Code: 5 













Type Code: 3 
Length: 4 bytes 
 
 Figure 13. Path Attribute Type and Code. 
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Table 3. BGP origin values and meanings. 
VALUE MEANING 
0 IGP, the UPDATE message was sent from a network within the AS of the 
receiver.  
1 EGP, the UPDATE message was sent from an external AS. 
2 INCLOMPLETE, the network(s) advertisements received by other protocols 
(OSPF, RIP) or injected manually by operator.  
 
Next-Hop will contain the IP address of the border router of an AS; therefore, this border 
router must belong to the same AS of the sender of the UPDATE message.  
The other type of Well-Known attributes is Discretionary. This type of attribute may or 
may not be present in an UPDATE message. However, in case found, then bound by Well-
Known rule, all BGP routers should recognise it. For BGPv2 there is only one possible value 
that is Unreachable. This attribute is used to notify the receiving routers that some of the 
previously advertised routes became unreachable.  
Another type of BGP attributes is the Optional. This type of attributes may or may not be 
sent along with a BGP UPDATE message, in case of being sent, it may not be recognised by 
a specific router. This attribute type falls into two categories: Transitive and Non-Transitive. 
Where Transitive attributes should be passed along in case arrived at router that does not 
recognise it.  However, for BGPv2 there were no Transitive attributes pre-set.  
Therefore, the next type of attributes for BGPv2 is Non-Transitive. This type of attribute 
is similar to the Transitive one; although differs with being dropped if it arrived at router that 
does not recognise this attribute. The only available value of this attribute for BGPv2 is Inter-
AS Metric. This attribute works on discriminating between multiple exit or entry points. This 
two bytes unsigned integer field would include a value that refers to link metric
3
. 
                                                 
3
 Link Metric, is a value set for every link exiting/entering an AS. The default BGPv2 settings work on 
preferring the lowest metric as the designated link for communication. 
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Furthermore, this field may be propagated to other routers within the same AS. Therefore, 
Inter-AS Metric may not be sent with an UPDATE message to a neighbouring AS.    
Finally, the last field of BGPv2 UPDATE message is Network. This field includes the 
four bytes IP addresses of ASes listed in the AS-PATH field.  The Network filed is variable 







UPDATE message length = Header (19 bytes) +Total Path Attribute Length + 4* Number of IP addresses 
Equation 1. calculating the length of Network Field (RFC 1163). 
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2.1.3 BGPv3 [RFC 1267] 
 
The summary of improvements of BGPv3 over BGPv2 could be illustrated in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Improvements of BGPv3 over BGPv2. 
FIELD FUNCTION IN  BGPv2 FUNCTION IN BGPv3 
Next-Hop In the UPDATE message Well-
Known  Mandatory attribute, this 
will contain an IP address of a border 
router of and AS. This border router 
must belong to the same AS as the 
initiating router.  
In the UPDATE message Well-Known 
 Mandatory attribute, this attribute 
now can be set for an IP address of a 
router in another AS.  
Identifier Was not suggested. In the OPEN message, this field works 
on avoiding possible collision by 
tagging the IP address of a specific 
interface on the sender router. 
 
The first being adding flexibility for the Next-Hop attribute in the UPDATE message, 
where it may accept the next hop being a router in another AS and not necessarily the border 
router of the same AS of the sender.   
The other improvement is adding an Identifier field to the OPEN message as shown in 
Figure 14. This field is configured by the sender router and the value of it would be set to an 
IP address of one of the interfaces of the same router. The BGP Identifier field works on 
avoiding possible collision that may occur when two routers initiate two simultaneous 
(parallel) BGP sessions with each other. Upon a receipt of an OPEN message, the local router 
would examine all of its connections that are in OPEN_SENT state. Then by comparing the 
BGP Identifier of the OPEN message against the ones in the OPEN_SENT state, whenever a 
match found (i.e., the local router sent an OPEN message to the remote router earlier) then 
another comparison is derived.   
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Figure 14. BGPv3OPEN message format (RFC 1267). 
 
This comparison will be performed between the Identifier fields of the remote versus the 
local routers. By considering the Identifiers as four bytes long unsigned integer; then finally 
the local router will opt to the connection with the higher Identifier value. In order to close 
the unwanted connection, the local router will send a NOTIFICATION message with a code 
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2.2 BGPv4 [RFC 1654, RFC 1771, RFC 4271] 
 
RFC 1654 considered to be the first Request For Comment that describes BGPv4 
standard. In this document, the protocol has undergone through further improvements. The 
overall modifications could be illustrated in Table 5; each of these modifications will be 
detailed later.  
 
Table 5. BGPv4 first draft improvements. 
FEATURE FUNCTION IN BGPv3 FUNCTION IN BGPv4 
Hold Timer In the OPEN message, this field contains 
the number of seconds that may elapse 
upon a receipt of successive UPDATE or 
KEEP ALIVE messages. This field used 
to be manually configured. 
In the OPEN message. The 
purpose of this field is to ensure 
the synchronisation of 
connected peers, in this version 
it could be negotiated prior to 
connection. 
Supernetting This concept is foreign to BGPv3, 
because in that version IP addressing used 
to follow class-based subnetting. 
Enables BGP to use Classless 






The UPDATE message used to have basic 
functionality such as providing one 
destination prefix to send the message to, 
or not being able to narrow the IP subnet 
using CIDR. 
Changes include using CIDR, 
adding new attributes and 
enabling BGP to express 
multiple network destinations 
using one IP prefix. 
 
Starting with Hold-Time, like previous versions of BGP, it is a field placed in the OPEN 
message. However, the change is in the operation of choosing the appropriate value of the 
timer. Therefore, after receiving an OPEN message, the BGP router will compare between 
the value of the received time and the value of its pre-configured timer. Consequently, this 
operation will increase the efficiency as well as ensuring the synchronisation of BGP peers.  
                                                 
4
 Due to the extensive changes performed on the UPDATE message, it will be described in details. 
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As for Supernetting, the first draft of BGPv4 was suggested to use CIDR instead of 
network class IP addresses (RFC 1518). This mechanism will allow BGP to express multiple 
network destinations by using a single IP prefix (e.g., 192.168.0.0/16). This IP prefix affected 
the format of the UPDATE message accordingly, Figure 15. 
  
 
Figure 15. BGPv4 UPDATE message format (RFC 4271). 
 
Unfeasible Routes Length – is a two bytes field that indicates the length in bytes of the 
Withdrawn Routes field.  
Withdrawn Routes – is a variable length field that includes within a set of unreachable IP 
prefixes; this is listed in a 2-tuple form, Figure 16. 
  
 
Figure 16. BGPv4 IP-Prefix tuple (RFC 4271). 
 
Length sub-field includes the number of bits consumed by Prefix subfield. Whereas, 
Prefix subfield includes the IP address prefixes followed by enough trailing bits in order to 
make the field fall within a byte boundary. 
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The next field in the UPDATE message is Total Path Attribute Length; this field includes 
a number that represents the total length of the Path attributes and it should correlate with 
Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) field (see NLRI description for details).    
Path Attributes – variable length field that is divided into a set of three sub-fields which 
are <attribute type, attribute length, attribute value>. The first sub-field is in return 
subdivided into two sub-fields: Attribute Flags and Attribute Type Code.  Attribute Type 
Code – is a byte length that helps identify the attribute type attached to BGP UPDATE 




















Type Code: 6 
Length: 0 bytes 
 
M.E.D 
Type Code: 1 
Length: 1 byte 
 
Type Code: 2 
Length: variable 
 
Type Code: 5 










Type Code: 3 
Length: 4 bytes 
 
Local preference 
Type Code: 5 
Length: 4 bytes 
 
Type Code: 4 
Length: 4 bytes 
 
Aggregator 
Type Code: 7 
Length: 6 bytes 
 
Figure 17. BGPv4 UPDATE attribute types. 
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Starting with Atomic Aggregate – it is a Well-Known  Discretionary attribute. The 
length of this attribute was set to zero, because this attribute could not have a data field. 
Therefore, Atomic Aggregate works on selecting a less specific route rather than the default 
more specific one. The aggregating router may attach Atomic Aggregator to an UPDATE 
message only if some AS numbers have been excluded from the UPDATE’s AS-PATH field. 
As for any router that receives an UPDATE message with Atomic Aggregate attached, it 
should be kept and passed to the peers as is.  
Aggregator – is an Optional  Transitive attribute; its length is 6 bytes. This field is 
divided into two segments, the first segment is 2 bytes and will include the AS number of the 
router that performed the aggregation of the routes for the UPDATE message. The next 
segment will be 4 bytes, and this will include the IP address of the aggregator BGP router.  
Local Preference – is a Well-Known  Discretionary attribute and it is 4 bytes long. This 
attribute helps with route selection procedure. Where the border router will calculate the 
preference degree
5
 of the external link and propagates these degrees to its internal neighbours 
via UPDATE messages.  
Multi-Exit Discretionary (MED) – is an Optional  Non Transitive attribute and it is 4 
bytes long. MED works on discriminating amongst multiple exit/ entry points of the same 
neighbouring AS (Figure 18). This attribute works only inter-AS, only in case of being 
received over EBGP then MED may be propagated over IBGP to another router in the same 
AS. In order to avoid conflicts, the receiving AS should not advertise MED to other 
neighbouring AS’s.  
 
 
                                                 
5
 Preference degree is a value that the border router calculates for each external link, this will be determined 
by the link speed, routing policies and other factors.  








Finally, the last field in BGPv4 UPDATE message is the Network Layer Reachability 
Information (NLRI). It is a variable length field that is divided into two subfields, the first 
being Length and the second being Prefix. The length will indicate the length in bytes of the 
next field (prefix). As for Prefix field, it will include an IP address followed by trailing bits to 
fit a byte boundary. In BGPv4, one IP prefix could represent more than one destination; 
however, these destinations should share the UPDATE’s attributes. Therefore, those 
destinations would be sharing the same routing configurations.  
After describing the details of BGP evolution from the first to the fourth, it was observed 
that BGP is still vulnerable to security breaches.  
According to the latest standard of BGPv4 (RFC 4271), BGP is relying on TCP as 
transport protocol. Therefore, this made BGP prone to the attacks that could affect TCP; these 
include Denial of Service (DoS), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), Message Replaying, 
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM), Session Hijacking, etc.  
Although BGP reacts upon receiving modified OPEN, KEEPALIVE and Notification, by 
simply disconnect and re-connect to the peer router; however, receiving an altered UPDATE 
message would not reset the connection. Therefore, this could be used to insert bogus routing 
information to the routing table.  








Figure 18. M.E.D required environment. 
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1. BGP is lacking the required integrity and peer authenticity. 
2. No built-in validation mechanism to confirm the authority of an AS to advertise an 
NLRI.  
3. No authentication for the Path Attributes announced by an AS.  
The main security issues and possible attacks are detailed in Section 2.3.  
 
2.3 Vulnerability analysis  
 
Because of BGP being the only protocol with the ability to connect different ASes; it is 
prone to security breaches. Therefore, this field is rich with security proposals, some that 
suggest using a specific security algorithm; others may suggest altering with BGP 
mechanism. These proposals will be categorised by initiation method of the security breach 
that they tackle.  
 
2.3.1 Generic Security Breaches 
 
The router, as a network device, is vulnerable to failure or misbehaviour whether caused 
by a device malfunctioning or by a targeted attack. Such deficiencies can motivate for 
potential attacks. One of the main generic attacks is the Denial of Service (DoS). The concept 
of DoS is multi-faceted and detailed; there are in fact many approaches for this attack that can 
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Table 6. DoS Causes and Effects (Kuhn et al. 2007). 
APPROACH EFFECTS 
Starvation A node receives fewer packets than it should because the traffic sent 
through nodes that cannot deliver it.  
Black Hole The traffic is sent to router that drops some or all of the packets.  
Delay Traffic is sent through paths other than the shortest ones.  
Looping Traffic sent through paths that have loops, and under increasing traffic 
leading to network exhaustion.  
Network Partition Traffic sent through networks that are isolated from the rest of the 
network (i.e., non-transit Autonomous System6).  
Churn Traffic sent through path that was withdrawn after the packets left the 
source node.  
Resource 
Exhaustion 








Network security researchers suggested solutions to prevent such attacks. However, due 
to the large number of router vendors and different operating systems, in practice risks of 
susceptibility to DoS remain (Kuhn et al. 2007). 
Another risk that BGP is vulnerable to is BGP “wedgie”. BGP distributes network 
reachability information and accordingly creates forwarding paths in a deterministic manner 
i.e., intended forwarding state. However, there are other stable yet unintended forwarding 
states for BGP. When a gateway router is in an AS; it will prioritise a customer advertised 
path over the pre-set AS-path i.e., BGP “wedgie” (RFC4264). 
This attack could be an attractive opportunity to a hostile party to disrupt a BGP session 
and may lead to hijacking of the session, where an attacker uses falsified packets to 
                                                 
6
 Non-Transit AS: is the Autonomous System that does not allow traffic to pass through to other AS’s this 
could be due to its location or routing policy restrictions (Kuhn et al. 2007). 
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impersonate a legitimate router in an authorised session. Figure 19 provides a diagrammatic 
overview of this problem. In a typical scenario of BGP wedgie as it is shown in Figure 19, the 
intended forwarding state for the reachability information is usually achieved by sending the 
traffic over the primary link using the path vector (AS4-AS2-AS3-AS1). 
In this example for illustration purposes, the primary link (AS4-AS2) would be 
deactivated. Therefore, the backup link (AS4-AS3) will be used to send the traffic around the 
network. Then AS4 will start advertising reachability information via the path (AS4 – AS3 –
AS1 – AS2). 
After restoring the primary link, the intended forwarding state should be restored. 
However, due to having identical path vectors on both sides of AS1, there would be a 
confusion of selecting the peer-advertised path via AS2 or following the customer-advertised 
path via AS3. Eventually, AS1 would opt AS3 as the path leading to AS4; because in default 
























Figure 19. BGP Wedgie example scenario. 
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In order to change the BGP forwarding state back to normality, administrative efforts and 
configuration knowledge must be present to block the updates sent from AS4 to AS3. This 
could lead to the withdrawal of the path and restoration of the primary intended forwarding 
state (Kuhn et al. 2007). Another suggested solution for BGP “wedgie” was published by 
(Agusnam et al. 2018) where they used systematic algorithm “greedy algorithm” to monitor 
load balance across the network in order to predict traffic paths changes. 
Further extensions of generic attacks might be possible and could include unauthorised 
access to sessions, eavesdropping of packets or packet manipulation. However, due to lacking 
the appropriate security measures, BGP is still vulnerable to generic and potential attacks. 
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2.3.2 Potential Attacks  
 
This type of attacks is usually considered greater risk threatening BGP networks. Such 
attacks could lead to tampering with routing tables which can potentially lead to significant 
breaches of confidentiality of entire network prefixes. 
Peer spoofing is a significant potential exploitation of BGP. Due to the absence of 
restriction or integrity checking that prevents such a modification within IPv4. The attacker 
can monitor a session of two BGP peers; and then insert falsified routing information to the 
peer’s routing table thus impersonating one of the peers (Man-In-The-Middle, MITM). 
Subsequently the attacker will have full access network traffic, leading to confidentiality 
breaches and/or manipulation of the session in real-time. In order to mitigate MITM attack, 
authors (Xing et al. 2018) focused on authenticating the originality of the messages by using 
RPKI; however, that neglects the restraint of resource consumption.  
TCP reset attacks, which are a type of spoofing attack (RFC 4953), form another potential 
risk. In this case the attacker will trigger TCP reset signals. Whenever a TCP RESET 
message is received by a router involved in an on-going session, then both ends of the session 
will perform a reset task in addition to flushing the entire routes learned from each other. 
Generally, this attack is considered to be difficult for an attacker to perform as it requires a 
significant amount of knowledge of number sequencing for TCP message transmission; and 
on the other side many countermeasures have been suggested to defend against such attacks 
(RFC 5082) and (RFC 2385) that implied using Time-To-Live (TTL) security mechanism 
and Message Digest (MD5) hashing function respectively. Further improvements for MD5 
were suggested by (Guzman et al. 2018) where the authors included logical operators in order 
to avoid collision attacks against the original MD5 algorithm. 
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Another attack targeting TCP reset is performed using the Internet Control Message 
Protocol (ICMP). This type of attack is relatively easier to implement than TCP spoofing. 
According to the latest BGPv4 standard, BGP does not require checking on ICMP message 
sequences (RFC 4271). Thus, an attacker can send control messages as TCP error messages. 
This could cause flushing the learned routes from the peer, when a hard error message 
received (Kuhn et al. 2007).  Depending on the ICMP error message, the router will take an 
appropriate action, ranging from re-establishing the session to flushing routes learned from 
each other (Chauhan and Saini 2018). (Gont 2006) suggested TCP sequence number 
checking mechanism that monitors this attack. While The NISCC Vulnerability Management 
Team (2005) suggested an improvement to TCP sequence checking technique by blocking 
ICMP packets by implementing a routing access control.  
Due to the possibility of having tampered ICMP exchanges, researchers suggested using 
IPsec to authenticate ICMP packets (RFC 4301). In this case, IPsec will be running in Tunnel 
mode (Figure 20) activating either the Authentication Header (AH) or Encapsulation Security 
Payload (ESP) (Kuhn et al. 2007). Authentication Header works on providing the required 









Inner IP header 




Figure 20. IPsec in Tunnel Mode. 
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Despite providing a relatively high security level, IPsec could cause more serious 
damage. As rejecting the received unauthenticated ICMP messages might be advisable if they 
were forged but those ICMP messages could be initiated due to router failure. Thus, rejecting 
them could cause denial or degradation of service, whereas, on the other hand accepting 
ICMP traffic could make the router susceptible to TCP reset attack via ICMP error messages. 
Therefore, an administration effort is required to configure IPsec against unauthenticated 
ICMP traffic in order to satisfy the security trade-off.   
Another mechanism was suggested to prevent the aforementioned ICMP attack against 
BGP (RFC 5082): that is Time-To-Live (TTL). The main function of this mechanism is to set 
a hop counter that is given an appropriate value that refers to one hop. Thus, ICMP messages 
of more than one hop away would be considered malicious and filtered. 
Although this proposal has low cost and enhances the security level of the BGP protocol 
to some extent, it has one drawback in that it does not accept packets of more than one hop 
away, which creates interoperability issues and non-standardised behaviour in general. 
Session hijacking is another type of TCP reset attack that is of relevance to the BGP 
protocol. It usually focuses on altering the port number, IP prefixes or AS-Path (routing table) 
in order to exploit the on-going session details (Mujtaba and Nanda 2011). This attack 
matches the TCP reset with the implementation but differs by black-holing the traffic or 
allowing eavesdropping and traffic analysis. IPsec, TTL hack and TCP number sequence 
checking could be used to protect against such attacks. Further proposal in (RFC 2385) and 
(RFC 5925) is to deploy MD5 hash function to protect BGP sessions by hashing the 
exchanged messages using a shared secret key or password. However, MD5 will add header 
which could lead to delay in calculations. On the other hand, the encryption mechanism for 
MD5 requires configuration knowledge as passwords need to be updated constantly to avoid 
brute force crackers, who assembled large number of hashed messages, to break the hashing 
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function and have the plain text.  Furthermore, changing MD5 passwords on both peers must 
be simultaneous; otherwise BGP session disruption may occur.   
Another type of attacks which would make BGP vulnerable is route flapping. It can occur 
by fast repetitive changes to BGP routing table. This attack, whether it was intentional (by an 
attacker) or accidental, could lead to slowing down message delivery or in some cases no 
delivery at all (RFC 2439). Nevertheless, in the same RFC, the authors suggested 
implementing an algorithm that records a penalty score to detect routers that excessively send 
update messages. This penalty score is accumulated every time the router sends update 
message in periods (i.e., 50 in one second). If the accumulated penalty score exceeds a 
threshold, then the session will be disconnected and re-connected again. This algorithm is 
called Route Flap Damping which implements the following equation: 
 
Equation 2. Route Flap Damping. 
 (  )   ( )    ( 
   )               (RFC 2439) 
 
Where P(t) is the penalty at t time, t’ is a time in future as (t’>t), and λ is a configurable 
parameter such that 1/λ equals half the time of accumulation.  
However, in implementing such an extension, the same mechanism could lead to greater 
threats to BGP (Kuhn et al. 2007). The other routers will reconfigure the path that passes 
through the repeated session-disruption victim router, leading traffic to pass via sub-optimal 
paths (i.e., extensive change to the network topology). Thus, it would be with lesser impact if 
the router was shut down and started over; in which, only session disruption would occur.   
Another mechanism was suggested in (RFC 4724) called graceful restart. This 
mechanism works by making the victim router to send restart request by triggering a “Restart 
State” bit in the optional Graceful Restart Capability field of the BGP open message.  If the 
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peer accepts that request, the victim will restart without traffic sent to other routers. The peer 
will receive a confirmation of the restarting router, after it is completed, by triggering a flag 
indicating that the other has gracefully restarted. Otherwise, if the peer did not agree to 
graceful restart request, then both peers will continue their intended session. This mechanism, 
despite not being cost efficient, will provide a level of protection potentially scaling to more 
serious risk types as Denial of Service. 
Because BGP uses Classless Inter-domain Routing (CIDR), this can make BGP 
vulnerable to route de-aggregation. This condition can be caused by router preference or by 
intended malicious action. As a networking device, a router will prefer the most specific 
prefixes assuming that they are the most efficient ones. This can lead to withdrawal of all the 
other routes learned from other peers. In addition, the same router will advertise those 
prefixes to other peers and the same presumption runs again. Thus, Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) and other parts of the network topology will be affected, as the traffic will be diverted 
and they will most likely be isolated from the entire network. However, some routers’ 
vendors have included a configuration option to limit the prefix specification (Team Cymru 
2021). 
In case of not having max-prefix limit option on the router, another mechanism was 
suggested in (RFC 2827) that is similar to a firewall in concept. This mechanism works on 
filtering the ingress/ egress routes of a border router. Hence an AS should have a range of 
prefixes that is allowed to receive or send and any path out of range shall be withdrawn; Then 
on the other side, the peer AS shall take into consideration the other AS’s range. Despite of 
being useful, this method requires administrative efforts more than the pre-set routers (Kuhn 
et al. 2007). These administrative efforts include reconfiguring the router to keep-up with 
IANA updates for newly allocated prefixes for ASes. 
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As an extension to a route de-aggregation attack, an attacker can inject malicious routes, 
by sending forged update messages, and this may lead to changes in routing policies and 
hence threats to confidentiality. This sort of attacks, which will be referred to as Malicious 
Route Injection MRI, again can be defeated by using route filtering mechanism by specifying 
the prefixes for the generating routers. To reduce the risk of such attacks, Message Digest 5 
(MD5) could be deployed to encrypt update messages sent between BGP peers (RFC 2385) 
(RFC5925). Furthermore, MRI can be extended further to destroy traffic flow by diverting 
the traffic to unallocated prefixes. Even though researchers suggested dropping unallocated 
prefixes (Team Cymru 2021), due to the daily growth of Internet infrastructure, those 
unallocated prefixes will soon be assigned by IANA to new Internet entities and void the use 
of unallocated prefixes as a security mechanism. In order to take account of any changes by 
IANA to prefixes, this technique requires constant administration to update the dropping list; 
otherwise, the router will start denying legitimate traffic. It is clear that such a solution is not 
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2.4 Security Countermeasures  
 
This section is focused on discussing different security suggestions to improve BGP 
security by changing the architecture of the protocol initially designed. 
 
2.4.1 Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP) 
 
This version of the protocol was considered to be the most promising one (Atkinson and 
Floyd 2004). S-BGP (Kent et al. 2000) was suggested to use two (i.e., double layered) 
hierarchical Public Key Infrastructures, (PKI), to allocate and delegate AS numbers and IP 
addresses; this was firstly appointed to IANA. However due to security and political 
considerations, the allocation and delegation functions were controlled by Regional Internet 
Registries (RIR). Therefore, RIR is authorised to issue a certificate (i.e., Certificate 
Authority, (CA)). An organisation (a) applies for an IP address and AS number from RIR; 
this considered the first layer of PKI and the following certificates will be issued (Figure 21):  
 Organisation Public Key Certificate- this will bind a public key (PKa) to the 
Organisation (a) signed by RIR (r), this could be represented as (PKa, a)r. 
 Address Delegation Certificate- this will bind IP prefixes (PFa) to the organisation (a) 
signed by RIR (r), this could be represented as (PFa, a)r. 
 AS Number Delegation Certificate- this will bind one AS Number (ASNa) or more to 










   
 
    
The second layer of PKI is between the organisation (a) and BGP router. According to 
(Krankis et al. 2005), Router Public Key Certificate will be signed using the public key of the 
organisation. Whereas on the other hand, (Kent et al. 2000) suggested using the private key 
corresponded to the public key of the organisation to sign the Router PK certificate.    
Despite the difference, the purpose of this certificate is to authenticate a legitimate BGP 
router, this is achieved by binding the IP address and the AS number that contains that router. 
Address Certificate (Attestation
7
): this will bind IP prefixes (PFa) to an AS Number 
(ASNa) signed by using the public key of the Organisation (a), this could be represented as 
(PFa, ASNa)Ka. 
Route Certificate (Attestation): this will bind IP prefixes (PFa) to an AS-PATH 
8
(ASPb) 
signed by using the public key of a router (PKRa), this could be represented as (PFa, 
ASPb)PKRa. 
 S-BGP Route Announcement is best described using the following simple topological 
design. Assuming three organisations, each having their own AS, each of these ASes has one 
S-BGP router, Figure 22.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 Address and Route Certificates might be referred to as Attestations, because they are not issued by an 
RIR, or any CA. 
8
 All path attributes will be included in this certificate, but for demonstration purposes AS-Path was 
selected. 




Figure 21. RIR/Organisation Certificates issued. 


















Starting with Organisation a, it has an IP prefix issued by RIR and this prefix is allocated 
to AS-a. Therefore, Router a (Ra) will send an update message including the prefix and ASN 
of AS a, this is signed by the public key of organisation a. The next step is verification in 
Router b, this will be described in the next step. After verifying the legitimacy of the received 
route, Rb will announce this router via update message to Rc. The update message received 
in Rc will be containing the prefix of AS-a, AS number of AS-a, and the AS number of AS-b 
and that update message will be signed by organisation b.  
S-BGP Router Verification is performed upon receiving an update message announcing a 
new route. The route is verified if the following conditions are met: 
Is the AS that originated the route authorised to announce its prefix to neighbours? 
9
 this 
is satisfied if that AS has:  
i) Organisation Public Key Certificate 
ii) Address Delegation Certificate 
iii) AS Number Delegation Certificate 
                                                 
9





(PFa, ASNa, ASNb)Kb 
AS-b 
AS-c 
Figure 22. BGP route announcement. 
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iv) Address Attestation 
Is an AS on the path authorised to further announce the original prefix?
10
 This condition 
applies to AS-b in Figure 22, and it could be verified if AS-b has Route Attestation.  
S-BGP Drawbacks are critical. Despite the high level of security, it is considered to be 
computationally complicated. Another point that S-BGP lacks in providing security for, is the 
vulnerability to route exploitation and DoS attacks. Furthermore, although the double layered 
PKI provides authenticity and verification; it requires involving third party to issue 








                                                 
10
 This condition is applied to avoid route injection. 
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2.4.2 Secure Origin Border Gateway Protocol (So-BGP) 
 
So-BGP was suggested to rely on web of trust model to authenticate AS public key 
certificates and strict hierarchical structure to verify IP prefixes. The concept for the web of 
trust model requires the participation of some of the main ISPs. As the Certificate Authority 
(e.g., IANA, RIR) will issue a certificate to the IPS’s AS, binding the AS number and the 
public key; this certificate will be signed using the public key of the CA (White 2004). Then 
in return, the certified AS will be able to issue further certificates to other ASes, thus the 


















Furthermore, So-BGP suggested using strict hierarchical structure to verify IP prefix 
ownership. This is similar to S-BGP for verifying IP prefix; however, in So-BGP ASes will 
be delegated IP addresses. This concept may not be practical because IP delegations in S-
ISP2/ AS2 
 






Figure 23. So-BGP AS authentication. 
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BGP are given to organisations rather than to ASes. Issuing IP address with full control to an 
organisation is reasonable, because there might be an organisation with more than one AS.  
In addition to the change in hierarchy of IP prefixes, So-BGP suggested adding another BGP 
message called SECURITY message. This message would be responsible for passing the 
required security certificates, which are:  
 Entity Certificate (e.g., router certificate)  
 Prefix Policy Certificate 
 AS Policy Certificate  
The SECURITY message was suggested to be transferred using Internetwork distribution 
method other than BGP (White 2004). For this purpose, Packet Design company suggested 
using a new protocol named BGP Scalable Transport (BST) (Duffy 2002). However, this 
proposal was not successful, because it did not get the support of ISPs to implement changes 
to router devices in order to support BST. This protocol suggests dramatic changes to BGP. 
Nevertheless, IETF is still studying the possibilities of passing the suggested SECURITY 
message of So-BGP without using BGP (Duffy 2003).  
Reflective Discussion of S-BGP versus So-BGP, as Kent (et al. 2000) (the developer of 
S-BGP) highlighted the limitations of So-BGP and claimed that it has disastrous outcomes 
from security perspective summarised in delegating IP address to an AS rather than an 
Organisation is impractical and architecturally unsound (Duffy 2003). 
Whereas, on the other hand White (2004) (the designer of So-BGP) describes S-BGP of 
being inefficient for ISP’s use. As he claimed that re-dividing the data is not possible in S-
BGP, thus S-BGP limits the authority of an ISP to reject or accept an IP prefix (Duffy 2003).  
Nevertheless, both S-BGP and So-BGP use hierarchical PKIs to trace the IP prefix 
ownership, therefore both proposals find difficulty in validating a specific prefix owner 
(Krankis et al. 2005).      
58 | P a g e  
 
2.4.3 Pretty Secure Border Gateway Protocol (Ps-BGP) 
 
This version of the protocol shares features with the previous versions (i.e., S-BGP, So-
BGP). Generally, Ps-BGP uses Centralised Trust Model to authenticate AS numbers. While 
for verifying the IP prefix ownership, it uses Decentralised Trust Model (Kranakis et al. 
2005).  
Centralised Trust Model is similar to the one used in S-BGP, where security certificates 
are managed by CAs. These certificates work on binding AS number with public key of that 
AS signed by the CA’s public key. The suggested model was claimed to be the best to 
authenticate and validate AS’s legitimacy (Kranakis et al. 2005). However, due to the 
required involvement of CAs, this model would either: 
 Share certificates upon the creation of new AS. This might not be safe, as it will give 
the attacker time to crack private/public keys of an AS, thus impersonate a legitimate 
one.  
OR 
 Constantly update the issued security certificates. This would be expensive for the 
reason that every AS should obtain a new security certificate from CA periodically.   
Whereas on the other hand, Decentralised Trust Model requires evolving ISPs and 
organisations (this is similar to the concept of So-BGP). The concept of this model is that 
each AS will create a Prefix Assertion List (PAL). This PAL will include the AS numbers of 
the neighbouring ASes as well as IP prefixes corresponding to these AS numbers (Wan et al. 
2005). Despite the merits of assuring the consistency of IP prefixes, this model could be 
proven inefficient if not supported by ISPs to provide PALs. In case some ISPs are not 
participating in creating PALs, then an empty PAL will be created for them in their 
neighbouring ASes. Thus, an attacker may claim to be a legitimate not participating AS and 
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exploit BGP routing information (Kranakis et al. 2005). Comparison of S-BGP, So-BGP and 
Ps-BGP could be illustrated in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. sBGP, soBGP and psBGP. 
Criterion S-BGP So-BGP Ps-BGP 
Confidentiality -IPsec or MD5 -IPsec or MD5 -IPsec or MD5 
Integrity -With the use of PKI 
certificates issued by 
IANA 
-Use of PKI named 
Entity Certificate issued 
by an authorised AS 
which holds a certificate 
issued by CA. 
-Less than integrity, just 
a verification an AS 





-No addressing for DoS 
attack 
- Route Exploitation 
- Eavesdropping 
-No addressing for DoS 
attack 
- Route Exploitation 
-Man-In-The-Middle 
(MITM) 
-No addressing for DoS 
attack 
- Route Exploitation 
- MITM 
- Message Replay 
Efficiency -Infinite calculations. 
-Impossible to discover 
the route transmissions 
-Ownership of an IP 
prefix changes 
hierarchically, which 
make it difficult to 
search for an IP owner.      
-Unsafe distribution of 
the public Key amongst 
the routers in an AS. 
-Needs to enrol a 
certificate authority as 
well as certificate 
exchange for the AS 
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2.4.4 BGPsec [RFC 8205] 
 
Proposed in 2017, BGPsec is considered the latest state of art and valid candidate to 
replace BGPv4 that is currently in use. Referring to section (2.4.1), S-BGP adds 
computational overhead which increases the BGP convergence speed although it promises 
the verification of authenticity of the advertised routes. Despite BGPsec being similar in the 
approach of adding a computational overhead to the packets of BGP (like S-BGP), however it 
utilises a reduced overhead which can solve the issue of computational resources required to 
maintain the convergence speed.  
BGPsec uses Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to authenticate IP prefix origins. 
RPKI, which is provided by different RIRs around the world such as ARIN and APNIC, 
works as signature authenticating that is the legitimate source of the packet. Moreover, other 
RPKI will be added to the overhead of that message for each AS that it passes through in the 
path reaching the destination AS.  
Furthermore, RIRs are responsible for issuing a certificate called Route Origination 
Authorisation (ROA) for the ASes within RIR’s regional boundaries. ROA works on 
specifying a range of IP prefixes that the AS is allowed to advertise. The receiving AS on the 
other end will verify the ROA that is encoded within an update message, if the ROA was not 
valid then the advertised routes will be rejected. 
Moreover, BGPsec ensures that the router inserts their correct AS number to AS_PATH 
attribute by using RPKI to verify the correct ASN. 
The aforementioned description of BGPsec looks very similar to S-BGP, however 
BGPsec only signs the verified signature that is embedded within an update message in the 
transit, therefore reducing the overhead issue that S-BGP was suffering from. 
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In addition to authenticating the source of messages, BGPsec can directly verify if the 
received routing updates are valid by comparing them to the stored records without 
performing verification operation (Lepinski and Sriram 2017). 
Despite the advanced research of securing BGP, it still suffers from major vulnerabilities 
(Li et al. 2014) such as Loop, and Wormwhole. 
BGPsec, however, aims to control the advertised routes by limiting ASes to a range of IP 
prefixes that they can advertise for, that is to prevent Malicious Route Injection (MRI). 
Although this particular feature of BGPsec makes it vulnerable for session hijacking or route 
deviation and MITM. By deploying a Wormhole Attack where two ASes having a tunnel 
communication to conceal that path of different ASes in between, the source and destination 
will be fooled to think that this is the shortest path which is in fact using forged path with 
valid signatures (Li et al. 2018) and (Li et al. 2014) as shown in Figure 24.  
 
    
 
Figure 24. ASes using tunnel communication to forge paths (Li et al. 2014). 
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Another attack that BGPsec is vulnerable to is Loop attack where traffic will be stuck in 
forwarding loop from one AS to another. This attack is achieved by launching a Mole Attack 
to utilise unused IP prefixes assigned within the range for them. Therefore, this will put the 
network in constant forwarding state as it will not be able to locate the address of destination.  
Finally, as it was highlighted by (Li et al. 2018) that BGPsec does not verify the data 
contents of an update message against the advertised routes. This specific scenario leads to 
allowing a malicious node to advertise for destinations that it does not have access to or not 
have the shortest path to reach them, which in return forcing the receiving end of that forged 
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2.4.5 Summary of BGP: 
 
Despite the number of suggested solutions to tackle different vulnerabilities of BGP, they 
are not addressing main factors. One of which is the number of different vendors of 
networking devices. The solution to DoS or DDoS is required to be scalable in order to be 
implemented in the variety of networking devices (Kuhn et al. 2007). 
Moreover, BGP is vulnerable to unintentional misbehaviour due to the nature of mesh 
network of the Internet infrastructure, which could cause to accidentally prioritise certain 
paths over other more optimised paths (RFC4264). This in return would require 
administrative efforts to reconfigure the optimised path (CRC 2018). 
Furthermore, A. Heffernan suggested the use of hashing function Message Digest (MD5) 
to provide integrity to the message and prevent alteration while transfer (RFC 2385). 
Although this solution might offer security while packet being transferred, however it would 
require extensive efforts to maintain. Firstly, the keys to decipher the packets will need to be 
renewed constantly in order to avoid brute forcing the encryption. Secondly it will require the 
decipher keys to be implemented simultaneously on both ends of BGP session peers, 
otherwise this will cause one end to use new key while other still using the old key which in 
return lead to packets not getting decrypted and understood on the receiving end (RFC 5925). 
Moreover, MD5 header will cause extra delay in processing the packets on the path of 
transmission which will in return lead to general slowing down of the network transfer rate 
(RFC 2385). 
Another suggested solution could cause a general delay to packet transmission is using 
IPsec to encapsulate BGP packets (Kuhn et al. 2007). While it provides relatively high 
security; however, it requires administration efforts to maintain, as well as causing general 
slow packet transmission and size increase for each packet to accommodate IPsec header. 
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Another suggestion was to limit the malicious route injection (MRI) by implementing a 
range of IP prefixes to each AS to send to/ receive from (RFC 2385). This solution might be 
considered good to control the Internet infrastructure. However, due to the constant growth of 
the Internet and IANA repeatedly assigning new IP prefixes to network entities (out of 
previously unallocated prefixes) this particular solution could be described as limitation on its 
own (Team Cymru Community Services 2012). 
With the latest iteration of improving BGP security, BGPsec was promised to mitigate 
certain attacks and vulnerabilities of BGP by offering authentication of the source (RFC 
8205). Although it still lacks the verification of the contents of an update message. 
However, after examining the operation of BGPsec, it was found to be prone to 
fundamental security breaches which BGPsec was supposed to cover (Li et al. 2018). These 
vulnerabilities include traffic loop, data manipulation, and wormhole which lead to variety of 
attacks including MITM and session hijacking.  
After a brief history on major issues and suggested solutions to improve the security of 
BGP, it is noticed that BGP requires a solution that is scalable to cope with the growth of 
network and increasing Internet entities. Furthermore, it requires a solution that can adapt to 
different situations aiming to limit the administrative efforts required to resolve the minor 
incidents. Other features required would be the speed of processing to avoid quality of 
service decrease, cost efficiency to avoid exhausting the financial resources, as well as 
uniformity in order to be implemented on the variety of vendors of network devices. The 
different vulnerabilities in BGP and limitations in suggested solutions encouraged reviewing 
more automated solutions. 
Therefore, aiming to address the adaptability in a solution for BGP to limit the required 
human interference, next section will discuss machine learning and examine the different 
applications as well as the different approaches. The examination of machine learning 
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2.5 Machine Learning 
 
Machine learning is a science field focused on autonomously improving machines 
learning capabilities leading them to learn and act like humans by feeding data and watch 
them evolve over time. Other definitions include one of the leading manufacturers of 
Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) cards Nvidia “Machine Learning at its most basic is the 
practice of using algorithms to parse data, learn from it, and then make a determination or 
prediction about something in the world.” (COPELAND 2016). The main objective of 
machine learning is to develop the ability to detect anomalies from new sets beyond training 
samples, i.e., evolution and adaptation of new paradigm, (Faggella 2019). 
 
Machine learning is mainly subcategorised in learning style into three: 
1- Unsupervised learning. 
2- Supervised learning. 
3- Semi-Supervised learning. 
The first tackles the ability to distinguish anomalies out of unfamiliar data sets. Whereas 
the second works on spotting anomalies from data set samples that it was trained against. 
Finally, the semi-supervised learning is to train the system against familiar data sets, and 
evolve it to cover unfamiliar data sets, Nvidia definition could fit into this category. 
Another categorisation, that machine learning could fall into, is the approach of 
implementation. In order to keep up with different iterations of messages exchanged across 
the network of BGP, this research is reviewing Artificial Neural Network (ANN) and 
Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) each for their own merits; due to their ability to create 
multiple parameters (generations) to adapt to different scenarios. Finally, a summary of both 
categories is given, in order to justify the reason to select certain method instead of the other.  
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2.5.1 Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) 
 
 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) could be described as structure of small, 
interconnected processing units (artificial neurons or nodes) that can handle complex parallel 
computations of data processing (Hecht-Nielsen 1990) and (Schalkoff 1997). ANN been 
utilised to solve many real-world problems mainly due to its learning capabilities and error/ 
noise tolerance. 
Generally, ANN is inspired by the natural human nervous system. In the nervous system, 
there are billions of neurons that work on transferring electric signals from one end to the 
other, reaching to the brain (centre of command) (Schalkoff 1997).  
Through history, researchers have been inspired by the natural neural network and the 
massive, detailed connections to transfer data with flexibility to and from the brain. Work has 
been done to imitate a simple reaction of neural network as early as 1943; where researchers 
studied the implementation of simple logical arithmetic operation (S.McCulloh and Pitts 
1943).  Similar to any novel idea in the research field, ANN went through ups and downs 
with regard to creativity and general understanding to different behaviour of natural nervous 
system while trying to reflect it in a computational environment (Hecht-Nielsen 1990). 
Jumping forward in time, the more recent use of ANN in science field spread to include 
different aspects of life. One of which was the implementation of ANN in image processing 
in order to complete missing parts of an image (Basheer and Hajmeer 2000). More recently, 
ANN was used in civil engineering for structural response (Cai et al. 2019). On the other 
hand, other researchers such as Jason Zhang decided to implement ANN in the field of 
computers malware detection and used PDF documents as medium of running the tests 
(Zhang 2019). The research of detecting malware in files was also done in different 
approaches such as file signature matching method or sandbox analysis; where a file gets 
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unpacked from its final format to be stripped to its original code which in return get analysed 
for matching strings of signature or altered strings as done by sandbox (Tzermias et al. 2011) 
and (Willems et al. 2007). 
Moreover, ANN was implemented in the field of intrusion detection, such as (Shenfield et 
al. 2018); where the authors used ANN to distinguish between shellcodes (malicious codes at 
binary level) and benign network code. The parameters of that ANN were optimised using 
grid search method. Despite the accuracy claimed to be 98% (which is considered high), the 
authors’ ANN was mainly focused on pattern recognition in binary level. Therefore, does not 
satisfy BGP needs in terms of protection against different attacks. 
Another usage of ANN in the field of intrusion detection was by (Malki and Heidar 
2008), where the authors used data gathered by Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) to test and train ANN. The authors used three categories of data that are: Normal 
(safe) network data, Known Attack Data (malicious) and Unknown Data (mix). The authors 
managed to achieve 100% accuracy in classifying the data whether malicious or not in the 
first two categories (safe and malicious categories). However, they had 76% accuracy for the 
mixed data. 
Furthermore, (Aftab and Shabib 2019) suggested using KDD Cup99 dataset to compare 
Feed Forward Artificial Neural Network (FFANN) versus Pattern Recognition Artificial 
Neural Network (PRANN). FANN is used for abnormality detection such as ECG 
monitoring, speech recognition and plant control; whereas, PRANN is mainly used for image 
classification and handwriting recognition. The authors tested the two ANN types against 
modified data for Denial of Service attack and few other attack types. The results showed 
FFANN surpassing PRANN in accuracy with 99.7% to 98.8% respectively. However, neither 
of these ANN types were suggested or hinted for BGP usage; that could be due to the fact 
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that BGP requires an adaptive scalable solution as the data are not centralised, rather are 
distributed across the network.  
Another usage of ANN was suggested by (Hodo et al. 2016) where the authors suggested 
using ANN for Internet of Things (IoT) to detect Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. In their work, the authors used ANN for offline data 
analysis to classify whether traffic was malicious or benign. Furthermore, the authors utilised 
C programming language to write a script to implement DoS/DDoS attacks on UDP. The 
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2.5.1.1 Summary of ANN 
 
Given the aforementioned brief literature regarding ANN, it shows that ANN is 
preforming well for data classifications as well as pattern recognition. However, due to BGP 
being the most scalable network protocol, it might not make ANN suitable for providing the 
required protection. According to (Dasgupta 1997), the core concept of the logic behind ANN 
is lacking the scalability  
As ANN is able to detect patterns or certain signatures in dataset, it might not be able to 
detect a malicious node (MITM) in the network as the data in the BGP network is not 
centralised in order for ANN to provide the required analysis. Moreover, in its nature, neural 
networks have a centralised node for command that is the brain. This would follow the 
implementation guidelines of So-BGP discussed in section 2.4.2; where Certificate Authority 
(CA) would be in charge of authorising the keys involved in the encryption of packets 
exchanged.  
According to (Castro and Zuben 2001), ANN processes the data as it is received, whereas 
on the other hand, AIS can draw an image of the environment (network topology) then 
compare the information received to that image. Moreover, in the same paper, Castro and 
Zuben referred to AIS to be scalable against ANN which is not. 
Therefore, there was the necessity to look for an alternative solution that would cover 
what ANN lacks in aspects of mobility, scalability and most importantly immediate decision-
making process by adapting to the environmental expansion. Thus, Artificial Immune 
Systems (AIS) was taken into consideration as according to (Dasgupta 1997), AIS falls under 
the same category of machine learning mechanics, as well as being originally inspired by 
naturally evolving systems in vertebrates. Therefore, the next section investigates the 
different implementations of AIS and analysis of its capabilities.    
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2.5.2 Artificial Immune Systems (AIS)  
 
The Immune system is well defined in the Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary “a 
complex system of cellular and molecular components having the primary function of 
distinguishing self from not self and defence against foreign organisms or substances” 
(Dorland 2011). By taking an overview for the distributed systems and the networks that 
connect them, it is most likely acting as any vertebrate body, they both have the viruses and 
the pathogens; hence the vertebrate body has natural multi-layers immunity against those 
external factors, these levels could be Skin, phagocyte, innate immune response, Lymphocyte 
and Adaptive immune response. 
The mentioned above layers could be represented in the distributed systems by firewall 
and anti-viruses and other security actions; however, the AIS represent the most essential part 
of the defence process, because it works on identifying the self and non-self cells in the 
designated system; hence in other words it represents the bone marrow in the human body 
which is responsible for creating the lymphocytes. 
The lymphocytes work on identifying the self cells from the non-self cells (Aickelin 
2000), these lymphocytes act an important role for the Immune systems as this system should 
know whether the scanned cell is self or non-self cell. 
Alternatively, in the distributed systems world, the lymphocytes are represented by the 
detectors that work using different techniques on detecting and identifying the different types 
of cells; the most common techniques for the detectors are negative selection and clonal 
selection. 
The negative selection, again it is a process that the natural immune system uses in order 
to provide tolerance for the self cells. This process could be illustrated by describing the 
antigens against the receptors and how they are created. 
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The receptors are created by pseudo random genetic arrangement process; these receptors 
are then expurgated in the thymus. This process is called the negative selection (Aickelin 
2000); the receptors that react against the self-protein are destroyed whereas the others that 
do not affect the self-protein are allowed to be transferred in different parts of the human 
body.  
Another description for the negative selection process is derived by (Boudec 2004)  as he 
said “B cells are created from stem cells in the bone marrow by rearrangement of genes in 
immature B cells. Stem cells are generic cells from which all immune cells derive. 
Rearrangement of genes provides diversity of B cells. Before leaving bone marrow, B cells 
have to survive negative selection: if the antibodies of a B cell match any self antigen present 
in the bone marrow during this phase, the cell dies. The cells that survive are likely to be self 
tolerant.” Obviously the receptors as (Aickelin 2000) used to name it, is the same B-cells as 
(Boudec 2004) call them; those two refer to the same objects that work on observing the 
foreign antigens and examine them whether they have any effect on the self-proteins. 
In contrast the negative selection still vulnerable for being inefficient “a potential problem 
with this scheme is that a non-self packet arriving during negative selection could cause 
immature detectors to be erroneously eliminated” (Hofmeyr 2007); however, it was assumed 
that the arrival packets rate will not be high in addition to having other mature detectors 
spread around the body to provide protection this will lead to small loss efficiency but yet 
still there would be a reasonable loss in this process. 
After the negative selection process finishes, the mature detectors leave the bone marrow 
or the thymus whether it was B-lymphocyte or T-lymphocyte respectively. The mature 
detectors, however they are still called naive detectors, are now patrol in the body parts for a 
limited life time, if the designated detector did not detect a sufficient amount of non-self cells 
then it would be killed, otherwise it will be promoted to a higher performance detectors called 
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memory detectors with a significant longer life time. The time that a detector consumed to 
detect the non-self cells could be represented as learning time. 
Although the naive detectors do not represent the highest performance detectors, they are 
still needed to detect the unaccustomed non-self antigens. The memory detectors have lower 
threshold activation this led to make them very sensitive to the foreign cells and take an 
aggressive action against them, hence the necessity for the naive detectors has become 
unambiguous.  
Other than the negative selection, the principle of the clonal selection discusses the basic 
performance of the immune response to the external antigenic incitation; thus it substantiates 
the concept of that only the detectors who were able to recognise the antigen proliferate, 
leading to selecting them against those who were not able to detect such a phenomenon.  
 “The new cells are copies of their parents (clone) subjected to a mutation mechanism 
with high rates (somatic hyper mutation).  
 Elimination of newly differentiated lymphocytes carrying self-reactive receptors. 
 Proliferation and differentiation on contact of mature cells with antigens.” (Aickelin 
2000). 
Whenever a detector (antibody) matched an antigen with high matching rate, the 
designated B-lymphocyte, which is responsible for the creation of the detectors, inherits its 
genes characteristics to its next generation and the proliferate of such cells occurs in a very 
short time hence there would be more detectors to recognise such antigens or as de Castro 
and Von Zuben said “one mutation per cell division” (De Castro and Zuben 2001); thus this 
provides very quick response for the antigens. The above mentioned biological details are 
shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25. This figure shows the human body and the biological details that 
effectuate the immune system (Boudec 2004). 
 
As an appreciation of the great creation of the vertebrate body, the inner antibodies are 
able to improve their performance by what is called in the genetic algorithm “learning”. 
There are two methods of genetic algorithm learning  
 Supervised learning. 
 Unsupervised learning. 
In the supervised learning, a set of data will be given in order to testify a designated 
model and compare the resulted data. 
Whereas the unsupervised learning, the data is unknown and the model is the only thing 
available thus the resulted data will exclusively depend on the proposed model. 
For the vertebrate body, the learning of the B-lymphocytes relies on the model of 
improving the performance of these cells in order to provide protection to the body against 
the external invaders; thus, the learning of the natural immune system is unsupervised and the 
reason being the external antigens is unknown as well as they continuously changing with the 
time according to chemical, biological and natural factors. 
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Alternatively, the distributed systems could be considered as the inner parts of the human 
body as they need to be protected against the external attacks, although the human body has 
its own immune system which the distributed systems do not. 
Consequently, the proposed research concerns the idea of adapting such system to the 
distributed systems in order to provide a significant level of immunity against external 
intrusions.  
The above information given before was delivered by previous research about the 
biological reaction and the analysis of the natural immune system’s concepts; hence the 
process of automating these techniques for the distributed systems would be easier to 
understand the weaknesses as well as the strengths. 
According to the statistics, most of the well known companies’ servers had been attacked 
in the past and the common question to ask is “do they not have a firewall installed on such 
crucial devices?” the answer would be, yes they do; the firewalls provide security for the to 
the network that could be attacked from external intruders, however most cases the intrusions 
found to be from inside the company itself as well as in some cases the attacker can hack into 
one of the open ports of the firewall. In such situations, the ability of the artificial immune 
system to detect intrusions became useful, thus the AIS able to prevent a potential attack to 
happen by starting an alarm or data blocking (Forrest et al. 1994). 
However, in contrast with the natural immune systems, the artificial immune system is 
still not yet proven to work on unsupervised self learning in order to produce a new 
generation of detectors that are able to detect an unknown attack; there are a number of 
theories that are discussing the implementation of the neural network or genetic algorithm in 
order to enable the designated system to protect itself against a known attack in addition to its 
ability to secure itself from external and internal new attacks by creating a new generation of 
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detectors that are able to detect such attacks, expectedly these theories would rather be 
implemented in the next few years. 
Consequently, the same mechanisms used for the learning in the natural immune systems 
could be used for the artificial immune system; those two techniques were the negative 
selection and clonal selection. 
The negative selection was slightly improved to deal with the “race” phenomenon where 
two detectors match the same antigen “detectors compete against one another for foreign 
packets, just as lymphocytes compete to bind foreign antigen. In the case where two detectors 
simultaneously match the same packet, the one with the closest match (greatest fitness
11
) 
wins. This introduces pressure for more specific matching into the system, causing the system 
to discriminate more precisely between self and non-self” (Hofmeyr 2007). 
In contrast to Hofmeyr’s theory of the race, another theory was suggested “Therefore, 
instead of the system generating and evolving B cells clones until the antibodies recognize 
the training set and establish a cellular memory, it is proposed that the training set itself 
constitutes the repertory of antibodies of the system” (Grazziela et al. 2007, pp. 59-70). 
Furthermore, theories regarding the artificial immune systems and their applications had 
been suggested by many researchers around the globe, in (Balachandran et al. 2006) the 
authors are discussing the misbehaviour detection in the wireless ad-hoc networks by using 
the artificial immune systems, they took the DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) protocol as a 
case study for the malware or the danger nodes. Other researchers (Sarafijanović and Le 
Boudec 2004) used the artificial immune system to cater routing problem. Moreover, 
(Alaparthy and Morgera 2018) utilised AIS for intrusion detection in Wireless Sensor 
network using RPL protocol. Another use of AIS in the field of intrusion detection for 
                                                 
11
 Fitness: is a function that tests the match between a model and a specific output, it is usually used in the 
genetic algorithm calculations and sometimes referred to by affinity. 
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networks was suggested by (Shen and Wang 2011); where by utilising KDD CUP99 dataset, 
the researchers suggested using AIS based system opting for negative selection to detect 
Denial of Service (DoS), unauthorised remote access attacks and network sweep attacks.  
Another suggested usage of AIS in the field of network intrusion detection was by (Igbe 
2019) utilising NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15 datasets. The author suggests using selfnonself 
(SNS) method of AIS to be applied on Distributed Network Protocol (DNP). The suggested 
methods and datasets were applied on DNP to detect Denial of Service (DoS) or Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks; albeit the results were not shared as of the time of this 
work.  
However, on the other hand, (Hooks et al. 2018) had investigated the effectiveness of 
Clonal Selection and Negative Selection in detecting intrusions. Hooks, et al. found that both 
selection algorithms were not effective enough to scale with network growth and claimed that 
is due to equipment limitations.  Whereas (Kim and Bentley 2001) tested both selection 
algorithms of AIS and found that Negative Selection could cause some issues regarding 
detecting network anomalies, however, they found that negative selection could work better 
as a filter to better attune the detectors created by a clonal selection algorithm.  
Alternatively, (Wedde et al. 2006) used the artificial immune systems to provide security 
for a nature inspired protocol called Beehive, and later (Mazhar and Farooq 2007) proposed 
using the AIS to provide basic security template that fits with the nature inspired wireless ad-
hoc routing protocol (BeeAdHoc). 
Moreover, the AIS had been appreciated in the field of spanning tree protocol and the cost 
versus the distinct topologies of the links among the end devices in the local area network “it 
is proposed a bio-inspired algorithm based on AIS to find a solution set composed by the k-
Spanning Trees with low costs and distinct topologies” (Berbert et al. 2007), and they 
identified their problem “Due to the combinatorial nature of the problem, where the number 
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of possible solutions grows as increases the number of nodes, it is necessary to use an 
efficient boarding capable to explore the search space of solutions in reasonable 
computational time.”. However, Sörensen and Janssens (2005), who were inspired by Murty 
(1986), designed an algorithm that handles the entire spanning tree but with detrimental of 
increasing the cost in sequence. 
Consequently, Rohit Singh and Nandan (2007) suggested using the artificial immune 
system to predict the stock shares market, they assumed that the antigens (non-self cells) will 
be represented by the weak companies and the accounting data represent the self cells “A set 
of accounting variables are used to represent a company. The values of these set of ratios 
provide a unique signature of a company it is the property of the company and each company 
will have a different signature. This signature can be used to classify companies in the AIS 
context as either self or non-self” (Rohit Singh and Nandan 2007). 
Another use of AIS was highlighted by Serapião et al. (2007); they have suggested this 
system to justify the petroleum well drilling automatically, while the most common method 
of deploying the AIS as a solution for a specific problem is done by assuming the learning 
process of the detectors would be unsupervised, nevertheless the last researchers assumed 
using the supervised learning scheme, as this type of learning requires to have a data set that 
is known to testify the model on it “The selected cells are subject to an affinity maturation 
process, which improves their affinity to the selective antigens. The computational 
implementation of the clonal selection algorithm takes into account the affinity maturation of 
the immune response” (Serapião et al. 2007). 
Moreover the artificial immune systems could be used in the computer networking field, 
one of the supportive papers was by Valdes and Skinner (2001) “To correlate Intrusion 
Detection Systems alerts for detection of an intrusion scenario, recent studies have employed 
two different approaches: a probabilistic approach and an expert system approach.” (Aickelin 
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2000). The mentioned probabilistic approach requires the expected intrusions to be known, in 
other words supervised learning. Another use of AIS in the field of networking was suggested 
by Vidal et al. (2018). 
Another approach is called expert system approach, this approach basically instantiate the 
alert of the known intrusions as they call it “low level alert” (Aickelin 2000); this approach is 
based on the hyper graphs which represent the known intrusion scenarios; however, these two 
approaches have problem (Cuppens et al. 2002) had identified some these issues:  
 “Handling unobserved low-level alerts that comprise an intrusion scenario. 
  Handling optional prerequisite actions.  
  Handling intrusion scenario variations.” (Cuppens et al. 2002). 
Revisiting the main usage of the artificial immune systems, the aiNET (artificial immune 
Network) idea was firstly suggested by (Jerne 1974), where he suggested the network to be a 
network of constrained cells and molecules that can identify each other as well as identifying 
the antigens absence; however (De Castro and Zuben 2001) disagree with the superficial 
explanation of (Jerne 1974) and amended that “The relevant events in the immune system are 
not only the molecules, but also their interactions. The immune cells can respond either 
positively or negatively to the recognition signal (antigen or another immune cell or 
molecule). A positive response would result into cell proliferation, cell activation and 
antibody secretion, while a negative response would lead to tolerance and suppression” (De 
Castro and Zuben 2001), and they carried on suggesting the details of how the idea of 
artificial immune networks could be implemented “Among these, we can stress the immune 
network theory and the clonal selection and affinity maturation principles. The immune 
network theory hypothesizes the activities of the immune cells, the emergence of memory 
and the discrimination between our own cells (known as self) and external invaders (known 
as non-self). It also suggests that the immune system has an internal image of all existing 
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pathogens (infectious non-self) to which it might be exposed during its lifetime. On the other 
hand, the clonal selection principle proposes a description of the way the immune system 
copes with the pathogens to mount an adaptive immune response.” (De Castro and Zuben 
2001). Whereas (De Castro and Zuben 2001) used the affinity instead of using the fitness 
which both refer to the same function. As the affinity term used in the vertebrate body while 
the fitness function is used in the genetic algorithm. The affinity as it assumed by (De Castro 
and Zuben 2001) will work to testify the maturation process of the lymphocytes or the 
receptors. 
Alternatively, the last researchers carried on discussing the idea of artificial immune 
networks “The aiNet model will consist of a set of cells, named antibodies, interconnected by 
links with associated connection strengths. The aiNet antibodies are supposed to represent the 
network internal images of the pathogens (input patterns) contained in the environment to 
which it is exposed. The connections between the antibodies will determine their 
interrelations, providing a degree of similarity (in a given metric space) among them the 
closer the antibodies, the more similar they are.” (De Castro and Zuben 2001).   
Consequently, as the researchers Zuben and De Castro discussed using the artificial immune 
system to detect the network’s node failure, M. Zubair and M. Farooq suggested using the 
artificial immune system to detect external intrusions as one of the security layers “IEEE 
802.11 has become the popular standard for wireless networks in recent years. Most wireless 
standards deployed today use IEEE 802.11b standard and it is the oldest (launched in July 
1999). With the increasing popularity and usage, several security loopholes and 
vulnerabilities have been discovered. IEEE 802.11b has been identified for vulnerabilities at 
Media Access Control (MAC) layer. WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) is a classical 
framework that is deployed at the MAC layer to provide security. In this approach, MAC 
frame is encrypted using WEP algorithm. Open source tools are available that can break 
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802.11b WEP. The researchers have also proposed a number of other schemes such as WPA 
(WiFi Protected Access) and WPA2 (in 802.11i) to cater for security threats in 802.11. These 
schemes have also failed to provide a satisfactory security level” (Farooq and Zubair 2007); 
another party researchers agreed with Zubair and Farooq regarding their point of view 
(Cuppens et al. 2002) suggested an intrusion scenario where the attacker will use denial of 
service scheme (DOS) to overcome the domain name server (DNS) “For instance, let us 
consider an intruder whose objective is to perform a deny of service (DOS) over the Domain 
Name Server (DNS) of a given network. In this case, a “brute force” intrusion would be to 
launch a Winnuke attack over all the machines of this network, expecting that the DNS server 
will be denied at the same time as other machines. However, this is not a very efficient nor 
clever way to proceed. It is more likely that a careful intruder will first use the nslookup 
command to locate the DNS server and then send a ping to check whether this server is 
active.” (Cuppens et al. 2002). 
Nevertheless, the artificial immune system still not yet fulfilling the main functionalities 
of the natural immune system such as the unsupervised learning of the detectors and the 
mutation; a hypothetical scenario was suggested by O. Alonso et al “In this technique, the 
fitness produced by satisfying an objective is distributed among the individuals that are able 
to fulfil it. Thus, individuals that satisfy objectives that others do not are rewarded, promoting 
diversity in the population.” (Alonso et al. 2007); another supporting point to the immune 
networks theory, (Alonso et al. 2007) were also enticed by Jerne’s theory of the immune 
networks; where they described the immune networks briefly “It is a population based meta-
heuristic, which develops a set of detectors (B cells
12
) that interact with data (antigens) and 
with each other. AINs perform unsupervised learning; they have been typically used for 
                                                 
12
 B cells: refer to the lymphocytes that were created by the bone morrow, or sometimes the term antibody 
used instead. But as in technical view the B cells refer to the detectors or receptors which will react against the 
antigens or the external invaders. 
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clustering, but have also been adapted to optimization, classification and domain specific 
applications.” (Alonso et al. 2007) 
Although, researchers’ papers are still barely about one concept or technique in which the 
artificial immune system could be best utilised and they are still aiming to improve this 
system to become typically as the natural immune system where Langman and Cohn showed 
a major disagreement, as they are afraid of getting into a situation that the artificial immune 
system will react against the antibodies themselves “There is an obvious and dangerous 
potential for the immune system to kill its host; but it is equally obvious that the best minds 
in immunology are far from agreement on how the immune system manages to avoid this 
problem” (Langman and Cohn 2000). 
Never mind the disagreement, the researchers are willing to undertake the adoption of the 
artificial immune systems in the different life aspects; one of the most important sections that 
will identify the positive against the detrimental effects of using such system is the algorithms 
that the system will fallow. 
The majority of the scientists agreed on the headline of the algorithms however there are 
some disagreements concerning the details as well as the implementation field. 
Firstly, the negative selection first phase algorithm, as the process of the negative 
selection is described previously, although it was for the natural immune systems; the 
negative selection occurs whenever a new set of detectors are created for the reason being to 






















The reject mentioned in the algorithm implemented in the real world by killing that 
detector and the reason for that if the detector matched a self cell then it will give a false alert 
about detecting a non suspicious object; otherwise the detector is generated to censor the non 
self objects. 
Moreover, the second phase of the negative selection occurs when the detectors leave the 
thymus or the bone marrow (for the natural immune system) for the T-cells or the B-cells 
respectively; the second phase of the negative selection deals with the detectors and their 
reaction against the antigens or intruders. 
The detectors that passed the phase one of the negative selection are called naive because 
they were not tested against the external objects, those external objects could be malicious 
which would harmfully affect the system. As the nature of external objects, they are sealed 
and not open source, hence the detector should acquire learning levels; another fact that the 
malicious objects are uncountable and keep updating and even changing thus the detectors 
Generate 
Random Strings 







Figure 26. The first phase of the negative selection algorithm as it was designed by (Forrest et al.1994). 
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should be kept up to date by deploying the unsupervised learning in order to detect the 
unwanted objects as shown in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27. The second phase for the negative selection (Forrest et al. 1994). 
 
The second phase of the negative selection is responsible for monitoring the external 
objects and with the aid of the detectors will decide whether the current monitored object is 
malicious or not, if it was not malicious then the loop goes on, and if the detectors scanned a 
malicious object, then it will give an alarm signal that reports an intrusion that had been 
detected. 
Secondly the clonal selection, the clonal selection is the process that occurs whenever the 
naive detectors passed both phases of the negative selection. The clonal selection, as it is 
working in the natural immune system, will select the detectors that matched at least one 
invader object, those detectors (smart detectors) will be promoted to be called memory 
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lowering the detecting threshold. Finally, these detectors will be unleashed against the 
antigens as well as against the detectors that passed the negative selection but did not match 

















As it is shown in Figure 28, the detector will start the proliferation process once an attack 
had been detected. Worth to mention that these detectors will copy their characteristics to 
their next generation in order to enforce the previous generation, the point of inheriting the 
genetic combination of the first generation of detectors to the next one is as the first 
generation has already identified the external invader then all it needs is more power to 
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Figure 28. The clonal selection algorithm (Forrest et al. 1994). 
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After the explanation of the negative and clonal selections algorithms and seeing how 
they work, the fears of (Langman and Cohn 2000) became more unambiguous, as they 
assumed a situation where the detector will pass the first phase of the negative selection and 
somehow it matched one of the trusted objected (self cells); then the designated detector will 
go through the clonal selection and start the battle against an object that should not be 
suspected; however the researchers are working and aiming to achieve the unsupervised 
learning where the detector itself will identify whether the current testified object is malicious 
or not, as well as improving the efficiency of these detector in order to avoid such critical 
mistakes to occur. An example of utilising AIS as detection system for prefix hijacking attack 
for BGP was suggested by (Zhang et al. 2019). The authors focused on prefix hijack attack on 
BGP and suggested a solution using immune network theory to improve prefix hijack 
detection model (PHD). Using python language, the researchers converted the collected data 
from Routerviews into ASCII code. The attributes extracted were IP prefix and prefix length, 
where these data are converted again into binary and set as antigens for the immune system.  
The antigens construct the problem scope of that research.  Following the antigens creation 
(self set), the researchers described the process of creating detectors; where they eliminate the 
detectors that match with self attributes. The main issues discussed in this research were IP 
prefix attacks.  The results were compared against S-BGP (PKI encryption) to distinguish the 
efficiency of low overhead in comparison. 
The summary of operation of AIS for detecting intrusions was given by (Yang et al. 
2014) Figure 29. 
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Figure 29. AIS as detection system layout (Yang et al. 2014). 
 
Furthermore, the authors summarised the operation of detectors generation, where they 
categorised these operations into four categories: 
• Exhaustive 
• Linear  
• Greedy 
• NSMutation 
The reproduction of detectors mainly focuses on the detection method used for AIS being 
Negative Selection.  
Nevertheless, the authors highlighted Clonal Selection Algorithm being faster producing 
detectors and having higher accuracy for pattern recognition compared to Negative Selection 
counterpart.  
Furthermore, detailed categorisation of AIS used as detection system was illustrated by 
(Kim et al. 2007). The authors categorised intrusion detection systems into two categories 
based on analysis approach, (1) misuse-based systems and (2) anomaly-based systems. The 
key difference between misuse and anomaly detection systems is the false positive rates 
compared to how effective they are against previously unknown attacks. Where Misuse-based 
has lower false positive and identified to be prone to novel attacks, whereas on the other hand 
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anomaly-based having higher false positive rate and to some extent able to detect attacks 
without prior exposure. This project falls under Misuse-base system. 
Another condition set by the authors to identify the types of intrusion detection system is 
placement; where they categorised intrusion detection systems into three categories, host 
based and network based and hybrid based. 
 Host based system, is placed on the host, it can detect if certain attacks were in fact 
successful and raise alarm for the individual host to be properly managed. This type 
of system is considered securer for individual systems but not able to detect multiple 
attacks on different hosts. These systems are also considered expensive, especially 
when the number of hosts requiring that system is high. 
 Network based system are easier to maintain where they are installed on the network 
and monitor multiple hosts connected to that node. Despite effectiveness of these 
systems, they lack in detecting individual or encrypted attacks targeting specific host 
(attacks through TCP/ IP or web attacks), nor they can detect whether an attack was 
successful in order to raise alarm for admins to get involved or not. 
 Consequently, Hybrid based systems offer the best security as it combines host and 
network based intrusion detection systems into one.  
Broadly, this project is considered Network based system. However, due to the fact that 
the terminal of BGP (the end user of BGP) is a router, then it can also be considered Hybrid 
based, as AIS is to be applied on all network routers that are BGP-capable regardless of their 
connection hierarchy.  
Furthermore, (Kim et al. 2007) suggested set of criteria based on which IDS can be 
reviewed: 
• Robustness: allowing multiple detection points with low error rate. 
• Configurability: the ability to dynamically configure itself. 
89 | P a g e  
 
• Extendibility: the ability to expand to cope with domain (network) expansion. 
• Scalability: the ability to gather and analyse data from distributed sources. 
• Adaptability: the ability to adjust to new network intrusions. 
• Global Analysis: the ability to collect data generated from events from multiple 
sources and analyse them in order to identify the correlation between them. 
• Efficiency: the system ought to be simple and lightweight in order to not cause speed 
degradation for the network. 
The aforementioned criteria are further discussed in Chapter 5.  
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2.5.2.1 Summary of AIS 
 
Given the brief history of the evolution of AIS, it was observed that AIS might be able to 
cope with the BGP requirements for providing protection against certain attacks. Since AIS 
can produce detectors that can be fitted for each individual router and having the ability to 
analyse the packets received from BGP individually and inspect them without causing BGP 
session interruption. Furthermore, AIS able to map the network topology, allowing AIS to 
adjust the UPDATE message path to avoid passing through malicious party.  
Moreover, for the reasons of having detectors, AIS is scalable enough to cope with BGP 
network expansion.  
Utilising AIS as intrusion detection system for BGP more specifically misuse-base IDS, 
AIS could be able to cope with the BGP expansion. 







6. Global analysis. 
7. Efficiency. 
In the next chapter, AIS modifications and BGP network layout are stated and explained 
leading to the simulation implementations and results evaluation. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
Starting with the literature review of the previous work in the field of securing the 
communications of BGP messages, where limitations and drawbacks were highlighted 
2.3Vulnerability analysis, BGP is still vulnerable for a variety of attacks. Therefore, this 
research started by evaluating the existing security measures. During that stage, analysis of 
the shortcomings of the previous work was carried out which is discussed in Chapter two 
(2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). The next stage was to explore the application of AIS for providing the 
required security for BGP, (Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2).  
This research was driven to answer the following question:  
 
The aims of this project are: 
1. Detect MITM attack. 
2. Prevent MITM attack. 
3. Detect Message Replay attack. 
4. Prevent Message Replay attack. 
5. Remap BGP network to avoid passage of messages and network communications 
through suspected network nodes. 
BGP was the chosen platform of this project, due to its importance as the only protocol 
scalable enough to handle communications between different ASes. After an extensive 
research in the field (Chapter 2: Literature Review), it was found that BGP is lacking the 
required security to protect against a variety of attacks in the network. Nevertheless, it was 
How can AIS improve the security for BGPv4 with respect to authentication and 
verification? 
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necessary to focus on the most common attacks that are MITM and Message Replay. In order 
to detect and limit those attacks and remap the network, it is needed to have an adaptive 
solution that is able to take a decision and respond to different scenarios. Hence, AIS was 
suggested to handle these objectives by utilising modified negative selection and clonal 
selection algorithms. 
The original negative selection algorithm was illustrated for computing field by (Forrest 











However, this design of the algorithm would not help the aims of detecting or analysing 
the packets received from BGP adjacent neighbouring routers. The reason behind needing to 
alter the first phase of negative selection algorithm is that Self Strings was presumed to be 
equal to the value of IP address of local router as shown in Equation 3, then detectors will be 
created that would not match that IP address only, therefore it could include IP addresses of 












Figure 30. Negative Selection first phase (Forrest et al. 1994). 
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Equation 3. Basic Negative Selection (IP perspective). 
       
 
Where    represents the newly created detector holding randomly generated IP address; 
and    denotes the current router’s IP address only. Alternatively, the suggested algorithm 















Equation 4. Modified Negative selection (IP perspective). 













Figure 31. Modified Negative Selection first phase.  
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Where    represents the newly created detector holding randomly generated IP address; 
and       is the list of IP addresses of neighbouring routers in addition to the current router’s 
IP address. 
Following these modifications, the detectors created would be compared against 
legitimate adjacent neighbouring routers’ IP addresses. If no match was found, then the 
detector will be created. This filters suspected packets from safe ones. It was assumed that 
OPEN, KEEP-ALIVE packets are safe since they need to follow the protocol initialisation 
steps to establish a connection with neighbours. Thus, the inspection of packets and source 
addresses is exclusive to UPDATE packets, since they carry the most sensitive information, 
i.e., routing information, which if were compromised could lead to variety of disruptive 
network traffic.  
After the first phase of negative selection, starts the second phase. This part did not need 
to be modified thus remained as illustrated by (Forrest et al. 1994); Figure 32. 
 
 
Figure 32. Negative Selection second phase (Forrest et al. 1994). 
 
After passing through the first two phases of initialisation (negative selection), the 
detectors are then tested with network traffic. The detectors that find a match of intrusion 
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according to (Forrest et al. 1994) is to increase their number and duplicating those detectors 
to cover more antibodies. However, in the case of BGP that part of the algorithm needed to 
be altered, since increasing the number of detectors would not serve any benefit, rather 
increasing the sensitivity of those detectors aids in preventing previous incidents from 

















Furthermore, in order to implement these algorithms into simulation environment, AIS 
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Figure 33. Modified Clonal Selection. 
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within each router’s configuration in OMNET++. The content of that node was Struct
13
 data 
type, which holds the variables of detectors created. The values of these detectors were 
sender’s IP address, ASN, AS-Path of the message and contents, as illustrated in Equation 5. 
 
Equation 5. Modified detector's values. 
    ∑
         
        
 
   
 
 
Where     , IP address of the sender, stores the sender’s IP address.      , ASN, stores 
the Autonomous System Number of the sender.       , AS-Path stores the list of ASes that 
the message passed through. And finally,    denotes contents field that stores the data field 
of the update message received.  
The detectors representing IP address of the sender and ASN are firstly randomly 
generated. These detectors would be first tested against own data (i.e., own IP address and 
ASN) if a detector matches any of these data, then that detector will be eliminated.  
Next step is to receive an OPEN message holding data of the peering router. That OPEN 
message is considered safe, as AIS is initialising and building an image of the network map. 
Once data is received from peering router, AIS detectors will make a copy of peer’s IP 
address and ASN to be added as self-cells (as discussed in Section 2.5.2) if a detector is 
found matching the data of the peer, that detector will be eliminated. The operation repeats 
for all the OPEN messages received. Once an UPDATE message received, AIS will be 
comparing the generated detectors against the received data if the IP was matching a self, 
then compare if ASN matching that of a self or not, if yes then add contents to contents (i). 
                                                 
13
 Struct in C programming language is a composite data type declaration that defines list of variables 
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However, if the IP matches but not ASN, then verify AS-Path, if found leading to un-linked 
nodes then create a detector with the sender’s details to discard messages from that sender. 
The reason to make OPEN message trusted, is that it has only information of the sender to 
start a peering session between two routers (Section 2.1.1) and AIS needs that information in 
order to reduce the false positive alerts. Without that data set of OPEN message, AIS would 
identify every node in the network as non-self cells (Section 2.5.2) 
The AIS algorithms rely on analysing the given data, inspecting the packets for any 
suspicious contents and take a decision and action to mitigate a suspected attack, Figure 34 
shows the work flow of the project. 
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In order to satisfy the aforementioned objectives of the research, a prototype was required 
to test against the security vulnerabilities. Since a laboratory implementation was not possible 
due to different vendors of networking devices and limitations in accessing and modifying 
the behaviour of routing protocols, therefore, Riverbed Modeler (formerly known as OPNET 
Modeler) was used as an environment for simulating the network and collecting the results; 






















Figure 34. Workflow chart for the project. 
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BGP and modified AIS on all messages of BGP. Further details for OMNET++ results can be 
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3.1 Riverbed Modeler 
 
Riverbed modeler is a simulation platform designed for commercial and academic usage 
provided by Riverbed Technology. The reason behind choosing Riverbed modeler was 
because of its rich library which allowed the composition of any network for different 
scenarios as well as end – to – end behaviour analysis. That rich library of standard models 
was mostly supplied by vendors themselves.  
Moreover, Riverbed Modeler has many features. Some of those features are: 
 Network Planning: allows planning, inspection and optimisation for communication 
networks of any standard. As well as reflecting real network management 
improvement based on simulated evaluation. 
 Development of new components: enables the feature of modifying an existing 
standard such as BGP to accommodate a newly created algorithm. As well as running 
real operational source code for configuration on top of the simulation platform. 
 Communication test bed and laboratory extension: extends to the communications 
cross platforms, in a way that packets used in the simulation environment could be 
passed over Ethernet to reach other real physical devices. An example of this module 
is System In – The – Loop (SITL). Thus reduce the cost expenses of experiments 
dramatically. 
In addition to the features of Riverbed Modeler, it was designed to allow three - tier 
hierarchy. Those are:  
1. Network Model: allowing the configuration of network topology and design. 
2. Node Model: provides an interface for node building blocks and links connecting 
them as well as processing queues and transmission / receiving data across the map. 
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3. Process model: the lowest level of programming Riverbed Modeler offers. This 
interface allows access to finite – state machine diagrams and kernel procedures all 
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3.2 Project Phases 
 
The project methodology includes two phases:  
 Phase 1 – development of a protection mechanism against MITM, 
 Phase 2 – development of a protection mechanism for message replay  
 
Since it is not realistic to test the proposed security mechanisms in the Internet 
environment, two prototype systems will be developed. The prototypes will be tested in a 



































































































Figure 35. Exploratory strategy. 
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3.2.1 Phase 1: Protection against MITM attack  
 
AIS is used to provide protection against MITM attacks. The algorithm developed to 
provide this protection is discussed in Sections 3.3 and 4.1. 
 
3.2.2 Phase 2: Protection against Message Replay 
 
This phase followed the MITM development phase. It included the development of 
security algorithms using AIS to protect against BGP message replay (Sections 3.3 and 4.2).  
 For both phases, data were collected using OPNET and OMNET++. The main metrics to 
test the algorithm and prototypes were: 
 Protection against security breaches 
 Processing delay 
 Dropped packets 
 Resources consumption 
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3.3 Overall Pseudo code  
 
The working principle of modified BGP node in this project could be summarised by the 











































BGP message received from TCP processing node; 
BGP session initialisation cross ASes relying on received data from intra-domain routing 
protocols;  
<Session started> 
If (Update message received = True) 
 { 
Send to AIS processing node; 
Wait for answer back from AIS node; 
If (Update message suspicious = True) 
{  
Discard message; 




{Proceed with BGP protocol procedure; 
} 
 






















Update message received from BGP node; 
Create set of detectors (1,2,3…i)  matching the following data 
{ 
Sender’s IP prefix; 
Sender’s AS number; 
AS_PATH field; 
Update message data field contents; 
} 
<MITM check> 
Int IP =  sender’s IP with ARP;     // validating the true IP of sender 
 
For (j=0; j<i; j++) 
{ 
If ( IP = sender’s IP prefix [j])        // Match in value and no masked IP found 
{  
ASN (j) = Sender’s AS number; 
AS-topology-path = AS_PATH field; 
If (ASN (j) = = AS-topology-path-1)    // if a match found of source ASN as part of AS path                    
{  Send to BGP (MITM detected);                      but not the last then decline message. 
 
Force quit AIS process; 
}                                                                          




Send to BGP (MITM detected); 




Int counter = 1; 
While (counter <=i) 
{  
If (Current update data field content = = Detector (counter) data field ) 
{ 
Discard message; 
Send to BGP (Message replay detected); 




<no message replay detected> 
Send to BGP (message is safe); 
Delete unmatched detectors; 
Delete old detectors to repopulate the solution; 
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Chapter 4: Simulation Design 
 
This chapter discusses the two phases of development of this project. In the first section, 
it is targeting MITM part, whereas section two tackles message replay attack. 
 
4.1 Phase 1: Protection against MITM attack  
   
In order to test the proposed MITM security algorithm for BGP, a prototype system was 
built and simulated using OPNET modeler software (Riverbed®), where AIS was embedded 
in each BGP router in the network. The reason for embedding AIS in all BGP routers in the 
simulation was to enable the modifications on the router controls. However, due to different 
vendors for routers (cisco, D-Link, etc.) and as well as having BGP standard fixed on every 
router, adding additional algorithm in real devices was impossible, therefore simulation was 
chosen to test and evaluate the application of the algorithm. Furthermore, the examination 
process is done concurrently along with other router activities, this will make AIS to analyse 
the IP prefix and ASN then make a decision. 
The network was designed to support three departments, each using a LAN. Each of these 
LANs will request access to remote servers (HTTP and Email) allocated in different 
corporations. Therefore, a heavy traffic will be generated across BGP network that connects 
these corporations.  Figure 36, shows the topological design of one of these corporations. 
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Figure 36. Corporation network. 
 
The BGP network is formed outside the aforementioned corporation networks. This 
network in return was designed to include seven legitimate routers and one illegitimate, as 
shown in Figure 37. 
Figure 37. BGP network design. 
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The malicious router (the red one shown in Figure 37) was configured to not include 
intra-domain routing protocol, whereas the other routers of the network are using OSPF 
throughout the simulation. The reason for deactivating the intra-domain of the malicious 
router (hereafter AS4200_rtr3), is mainly to demonstrate Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack. 
Furthermore, this router was programmed to act as an attacker, where it will attempt to 
connect to other BGP routers and after the check of the routing table and rectifying with the 
neighbours, the legitimate routers will reject this connection.  
In order to illustrate the design, Figure 38 shows the logical topology of the prototype. 
The corporal BGP routers (R- A) in this scenario will perform a check before accepting any 
connection from any other router (R- B). This check includes analysing the IP interface and 
AS number of that router. Since BGP routers start all simultaneously except AS4200_rtr3, the 
connections first will be between the routers of the same network using OSPF. This 
connection is presumed safe (in real networks this is covered by using other protocols RIP or 
OSPF). Therefore, the connection will be established.  
However, for later peering between two routers of different ASes, R-A will check for R-B 
authenticity by rectifying the routing table of R-C (R-B’s internal neighbour) Figure 38
14
. 







                                                 
14
 R-0 is a terminal router and has no other connection than R-A therefore it will not be included in 
AS_PATH validation. 

















For this scenario, AS4200_rtr3 is not authorised by its neighbours, therefore the other 
routers in network will deny the connection attempts and will forward the traffic to pass 
through other ASes. This is done by changing the Next-Hop address to the appropriate one 














Figure 38. Logical design for the prototype. 















Figure 39. Traffic falsely directed to AS4200_rtr3. 
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Figure 40. Traffic redirected to other routers. 
 
This project, like any technical projects, faced obstacles and attempts to configure BGP 
router and implement AIS to that environment with the maximum representation of real 
networks.  
The first attempt of adapting AIS to BGP was focused on using a module in OPNET 
simulator that is called System In The Loop (SITL). This module allows the simulated 
network in OPNET software to communicate with real physical devices using the Ethernet 
ports. Despite the claims in documentation of SITL that stated the supported protocols and 
BGP was one of them, in the practical implementation it was found incompatible with BGP 
packets, instead it passed RIP and OSPF messages. Therefore, AIS was found suitable to be a 
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process model that is added to BGP process models, and this was achieved by using OPNET 




Figure 41. Processing nodes of BGP routers. 
 
The main concept of this design could be illustrated in the following steps: 
1) BGP receives a message from the process model of TCP after removing the TCP 
header.  
2) Figure 42 shows the process model for BGP in OPNET. 
 




Figure 42. Process modules of BGP process node. 
 
3) After the initialisation for the variables of BGP process model, the process model will 
import the routing table of the adjacent routers that are connected by intra-domain 
routing protocols.  
4) BGP model will work on initiating a session with the routers of the other ASes which 
were learned from the imported routing tables. 
5) At this stage, an open message was sent to another router and the current router is 
waiting for the response back, thus the process will wait for an event in the Active 
node. This event could be a receipt of open-confirm, receipt of a new open message 
from another router, or node failure due to device malfunction. 
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6) In the next step, the current BGP router will receive a message after confirming the 
receipt of the OPEN message by the other end of the session. The next received 
message would be either UPDATE or KEEPALIVE messages.  
7) In this node if the message received was a KEEPALIVE it will be processed by BGP 
modules, however, if the received message was an UPDATE message, then BGP will 
forward it to AIS process modules.  
8) The AIS process module consists of three processing nodes 
a)  The first one being for the initialisation of the global variables 
b) The second node will be for the listening on the link connected to BGP process 
model while being in idle stage. 
c) The third node is where the processing of the BGP message would be achieved. 
Accessing this stage will be conditioned upon receiving a message sent from BGP 
process module, Figure 43.  
 
 
Figure 43. AIS process modules. 
 
8) After the processing is done, AIS module will send the packet back to BGP process 
modules provided the packet was safe, otherwise the packet will be discarded after 
registering the IP address of the sender and the AS number.   
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9) BGP will receive the message from AIS, and it will perform the required procedures 
to update the routing tables and maintain the on-going connections. 
4.2 Phase 2: Protection against Message Replay 
 
This part of the project was developed after the first phase (Section 4.1). This indicates 
that all the changes to BGP behaviour and modifications to nodes were active, including 
AS4200_Rtr3 being MITM. 




Figure 44. Message Replay attack enviornment. 
 
Access Router, shown above, was configured to save a randomly chosen update message 
and replay it to the adjacent router (AS 4200_Rtr2), Figure 45.  
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Figure 45. The Global network topology. 
 
The method used to create a random number was linear congruential generator (LCG) 
(Sergios 2015). In the book, the author suggested the following equation: 
 
Equation 6. Random number generator. 
     (     )     
 
Where M is a large prime number and α is an integer number. Mod is the modulus 
mathematical operation. 
This formula works on generating random numbers, it could result in incremental or 
decremental value each run. Since it is used in this project to randomly select a message to 
record and play back (message replay); it is not logical to have decremented value of the 
previous value. Therefore, the equation is used in a conditional state that the current value of 
Zi+1 must be greater than the previous one Zi.  
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The equation above was implemented in Access Router of Corp C, Figure 45. The 
random message will be recorded and intentionally replace the next message to be 
transferred.  
Similar to 4.1, once the message gets delivered to destination router, it will be unpacked 
and forwarded to AIS node, Figure 41. AIS node in return will analyse the contents and 
verify whether the message was repeated or not based on originating router’s AS number and 
IP prefix versus the contents of the message. If these values combined triggered a match 
against AIS detectors, then the received message will be discarded. Otherwise, the message 





























RNG equation begins 
AIS begins to create detectors assigned 
with AS number, IP prefix and contents 




UPDATE message received 
No 
Figure 46. Message Replay working flowchart. 
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4.3 OMNET++ Layout 
 
The main aim for the design of the layout of the network was to provide high network 
traffic to stress and emphasise the delay in response for individual network nodes. Therefore, 




Figure 47. Outer layer of the BGP network in OMNET++ (see Appendix E for a 
larger version of this image). 
 
Inside each of these nodes in Figure 47, there is a smaller network consisting of eight 
BGP capable routers, one MITM router, six normal users and two attackers, as shown in 
Figure 48. 
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Figure 48. Mid-layer BGP network. 
 




Figure 49. BGP-Capable router configuration. 
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The AIS module seen in the Figure 49 above was recalled in the BGP node, due to 
difference in the options of Riverbed versus OMNET++ programming and configuration it 
was not possible to reconfigure the routers’ layers without needing to reprogram the entire 
modeler itself.  
Referring to Figure 48, each attacker in the mid-layer network was configured to have 
fifteen queues to initiate and target Enterprise 1 as shown in the same figure. Figure 50 shows 
the configuration of each attacker node in the mid-layer network. 
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Chapter 5: Results and Evaluation 
 
5.1 OPNET (Riverbed) Modeler 
 
5.1.1 Part One: MITM 
 
This project was tested against MITM attack performed by AS4200_Rtr3. In addition to 
the attack, the network was loaded with 100, 400 and 500 seeds to multiply the traffic 
generation events cross the network. Traffic load is set to include: 
 Heavy HTTP Image browsing 
 High email load 
 High resolution video conferencing 
Despite the heavy load, there was no dramatic drop of traffic received. The flat line 
showing in Figure 51 starting at 0m timeline to 1m:50s is time taken to establish BGP 
sessions and other routing protocols across the network. Moreover, at 6m, 11m, 15m, and 
18m traffic stability drops relatively due to network remapping for MITM attacks.  
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Figure 51. HTTP traffic with three different loads. 
 
 
On the other hand, the speed of the simulation is relatively high, considering the high 
traffic and the internal decision making processes to detect an attack and remap the network, 
Figure 52. The average speed of processing the received data and analyse the threat and 
authorisation of sender is 200,612 events per second against 3,127,746 events total. The 
initial stable slope of the graph starting at 0s to 125s simulated time refers to the initialisation 
of BGP sessions for peers in the network. The drops in graph at 300s, 400s, 520s and 800s 
indicate the remapping of network topology for each of the four routers directly connected to 
AS4200_Rtr3 (the MITM router) Figure 39 (page 109). 
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Figure 52. Simulation speed. 
 
Furthermore, the memory usage is stable. This proves that the processing of the suggested 
algorithm does not have accumulation of static values that in return lead to memory overflow 
and causing device malfunction and failure, Figure 53.  
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Figure 53. Memory usage: showing no exponential increase in the usage of memory 
resource over time (X-axis represents simulation time, Y-axis refers to memory usage in 
Mega Bytes). 
 
As for BGP results, they are shown next. In Figure 54, keep-alive message traffic is 
shown for four routers including the MITM router (AS4200_Rtr3). Referring to Section 
2.1.1, BGP was designed to exchange keep-alive message in order to maintain an ongoing 
session, therefore, if a router does not have an active ongoing session, it will not exchange 
any, Figure 54. The blue line shows the keep-alive exchange rate for router AS4200_Rtr3, 
which is flat, indicating there was no active session for that router to maintain. On the other 
hand, AS4200_Rtr4 keep-alive message exchange rate (shown as brown line) was almost 
double compared to AS3561_Rtr2 and AS1239_Rtr2 (Figure 45 (page 117) shows the 
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general network topology). The reason for the increased rate of keep-alive message exchange 
rate on router AS4200_Rtr4 is that this router has three neighbouring routers (Corp A [AS 
10001], AS4200_Rtr1 and AS4200_Rtr2) each having a session to maintain with 
AS4200_Rtr4. Whereas AS3561_Rtr2 (shown as red line in Figure 54) and AS1239_Rtr2 
(shown as green line in Figure 54) having to maintain one more session each in addition to 
the active session between the two of these routers. 
  
Figure 54. Keep-Alive packets traffic (X-axis is time in minutes, Y-axis is packets 
received)(see Appendix A for a larger version of this figure). 
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Nevertheless, the general traffic was captured to show the difference of load between 
BGP traffic sent versus packet received, Figure 55. 
 
 
Figure 55. BGP Traffic Sent vs. Traffic received showing BGP network functioning 
properly (X-axis is time in seconds, Y-axis is data transmitted in bits)(see Appendix B for a 
larger version of this figure). 
 
As shown in Figure 55, the generated traffic represented by the red stripe, is higher at the 
first spike compared to the blue one. This proves that the AS4200_rtr3 is initialising BGP and 
sends packets to its neighbours attempting to establish a session, but these messages were 
discarded, Whereas, for the rest of the time line the sent packets and received packets are 
exactly the same, this proves there are no packets unintentionally dropped, Figure 56 and 
Figure 57.  
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Figure 56. BGP traffic sent/received showing that no packets dropped, Red line 
represents packets sent, while Blue line represents packets received (zoomed-in of a 
section of figure 55). 
 
Figure 57. BGP traffic sent/ received (Figure 55 zoomed-in horizontally). 
128 | P a g e  
 
In summary, despite the load of traffic generated with different seeds in the simulation, 
there was no unintentional drop of packets nor there was any noticeable factor hindering the 
speed to process the given 3,127,746 events. Moreover, the simulation speed graph in Figure 
52 shows the mere drop of processing speed caused by network remapping, satisfying aim 
number five (Page 91). Moreover, memory usage as shown in Figure 53 is stable mitigating 
the possibility of memory overflow which can cause device failure.  
Furthermore, keep-alive message is exchanged at a high frequency among the legitimate 
network routers, unlike AS4200_Rtr3 that did not manage to exchange any. That indicates a 
complete isolation to AS4200_Rtr3 from BGP sessions; this satisfies aim number one (Page 
90). On the other hand, the general BGP traffic exchanged across the network clearly 
indicates that there were attempts by AS4200_Rtr3 to establish a session with any of its 
neighbours, nevertheless they were not successful; with this, aim number two is met (Page 
90). 
Next section will discuss the second phase of the project regarding message replay attack 
and analyse the collected results. 
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5.1.2 Part Two: Message Replay 
 
The second phase of the project was tested against message replay to confirm how AIS 
processing module would affect BGP’s performance regarding speed and packet drop. In 
addition to performance in speed and packet dropped, this section focused on verifying that 
no message had been re-advertised and accepted on the other end compromising the routing 
tables. The network topology is as shown in Figure 58. 
 
 
Figure 58. Main network topology. 
 
Unlike MITM part of the project, this attack resides in the environment of Corp C. In 
order to increase the stress over the network, Corp C was configured to include two attacking 
nodes and a configured access router to perform message replay attack of a random message, 
Figure 59. 




Figure 59. Message Replay, IP spoofing, and MITM attacks environment. 
 
Attacker 1 was configured to attack the network with IP spoofing through the network to 
Corp A (AS 10001) to increase the traffic spam generated across the network. Whilst 
Attacker 2 was assigned to play the role of man in the middle and intercept a message and 
attempt to view the contents or redirecting the message by tampering with its contents. 
Finally, Access Router was configured to replay random update messages to AS4200_Rtr2, 
as shown in Figure 60. 
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Figure 60. Traffic path generated from Corp A, B and C. 
 
Moreover, being the optimised path leading to Corp A (AS 10001), AS4200_Rtr2 is 
receiving the majority of the traffic generated from Corp C compared to the other neighbour 
of Corp C (AS1239_Rtr1). The increase of traffic received on AS4200_Rtr2 is caused by 
Attacker 1. Therefore, the traffic generated by Attacker 1 is serving as a stress test to congest 
the network routers with more packets to process. 
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Figure 61. Point to point throughput between Corp C and neighbours (X-axis 
indicating time in seconds, Y-axis indicating bits). 
  
In Figure 61 from 0s to around 100s, the point to point throughput between Corp C and 
AS4200_Rtr2 shows low value that is caused by the Attacker 1 IP spoofing initialisation. 
Especially when compared to Corp C to AS1239_Rtr1 where it shows flat value for 50s only 
starting from 0s timeline. After the 100s timeline, throughput value between Corp C and 
AS4200_Rtr2 rises to nearly 4000 bits per second, followed by a drop to 3000 bits per second 
at around 400s on the timeline and stabilises around that value indicating no issues in traffic 
being processed. The traffic for IP spoofing initiated by attacker 1 directed toward Corp A 
(AS10001) is shown in Figure 62, which correlates to the 100s delay of traffic shown in 
Figure 62 between Corp C and AS4200_Rtr2. 
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Figure 62. IP Spoofing from Corp C to Corp A (X-axis indicating time in minutes, Y-
axis indicating packets). 
 
Furthermore, the overall IP ping packets dropped cross the network are shown in Figure 
63. 
 
Figure 63. IP ping packets dropped (X-axis refers to time in minutes, Y-axis refers to 
packets). 
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At the start of initialisation of network and BGP sessions set up, it is expected to have a 
ping packets drop as shown in the figure above till around 100s on the time line. From that 
point onward, there was no packet drop; indicating that the network could handle the mass of 
traffic generated without unintentional packet drop due to processing delay leading to TTL 
(Time To Live) expiry.  
Finally, the BGP message replay initiated from Corp C (AS 30001) to AS4200_Rtr2 
performed by Access Router residing in Corp C. 
 
 
Figure 64. Message Replay attack attempt (X-axis is Time, Y-axis is update packets). 
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As shown in Figure 64 above, the communication between AS4200_Rtr2 and Corp C 
(AS30001) were monitored. The Subnetwork Corp C was configured to initiate a message 
replay attack at random time toward AS4200_Rtr2. At around 5m:50s in Figure 64, there was 
an Update message sent from Corp C directed to AS4200_Rtr2, however it was intentionally 
discarded; due to AIS processing node embedded within AS4200_Rtr2, process modules had 
successfully identified a match with AS number, IP of sender and message contents being 
repeated. 
 
In summary, IP spoofing attack did not affect the network speed or packet dropped 
considering one terminal in Corp C was configured to attack a host in Corp A on the other 
side of the network. Moreover, processing delay was relatively fast indicated by the lack of 
packets dropped due to TTL expiry. Finally, Message Replay was initiated to repeat a BGP 
UPDATE message in order to falsify the integrity of routing tables. Furthermore, the 
malicious UPDATE message was set to be selected randomly with the aid of using LCG 
equation (Sergios 2015), in order to prevent anticipating the attack time occurrence. 
However, AIS had successfully identified the repeated message and discarded it, therefore 
satisfies Aims 3 and 4 (Page 90) respectively. Referring to brief history of BGPsec (Section 
2.4.4) and how it relates to S-BGP (Section 2.4.1) the following Table 8 shows a theoretical 
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Table 8. Comparison of S-BGP, BGPsec and BGPv4 +AIS. 
Criterion S-BGP (Kent et al. 
2000) 
BGPsec [RFC 8205] BGPv4 +AIS 
Confidentiality -IPsec or MD5 -IPsec or MD5 -Can take MD5 or any 
other hashing algorithm 
(not included in this 
project). 
Integrity -With the use of PKI 
certificates issued by 
IANA 
-Use of RPKI named 
Route Origination 
Authorisation (ROA) 
issued by RIRto AS 
which limits the range 
of IP prefixes allocated 
to each AS to send/ 
receive from. 
-No integrity, but 
verification of the path 
and origin of sender’s 
ASN and IP prefix by 
analysing the path 
attributes and NLRI 
fields in the UPDATE 
message. 
Authentication -With the use of PKI the 




-Using RPKI to sign the 
previous signature of 
the message in transit, 
leading to reducing the 
computational 
overhead. 
- Using AIS detectors 
assigned to learn the 
adjacent routes learned 
via internal routing 
protocols such as OSPF 
and RIP, to draw an 
image of the network 
topology. 
Verification -Not addressed. - Verification of 
previous signatures of 
message in transit; in 
other words, 
verification only to the 
path of the message. 
- That verification was 
found lacking according 
to (Li et al. 2018). 
- Verification of the path 
attributes and IP prefix 
using AIS path detectors 
that work on mapping 
the topology of the 
network to detect and 
block MITM. 
- Verification of the 
content of the message 
to detect and avoid 
message replay attacks. 
Attack 
Vulnerability 
-No addressing for DoS 
attack 
- Route Exploitation 
- Eavesdropping 
- Route Looping 
- Wormhole Attack 




- Simplest form of 
service test was 
performed using ICMP 
spoofing; it did not 
affect the operation 
however it was not 
addressed as one of the 
issues to tackle.  
- BGP Wedgie 













-Yes, in order to keep 
updating PKI. 
- Yes, to maintain RPKI 
and IP prefixes 
allocations when 
updated by IANA due 
to Internet growth. 
-No, AIS handles the 
minor issues that might 
rise due to false route 
advertisements and 
message replays. 
-No update required 
when Internet expands. 
Convergence 
Speed decrease 
-Yes, due to the 
computationally heavy 
overhead. 
-Yes, lower than S-BGP 
overhead but still causes 
delay in BGP operation. 
-No, the convergence 
speed of BGP is as it is. 
Since the stand-alone 
processing node AIS 
handles the analysis of 
data of received packets, 
BGP operational speed 
is not affected. 
Efficiency -Infinite calculations. 
-Impossible to discover 
the route transmissions 
-Route prediction and 
route discovery are still 
impossible which 
makes it vulnerable to 
tunnelling 
communications such as 
Mole Attack.  
- Requires RIR to 
constantly update ROA 
and IP prefixes range.    
-For the time being, 
works only on the multi-
homed ASes where more 
than one AS is 
connected, since it 
works on learning the 
path from multiple 
sources to build network 
topology.  
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5.2 OMNET++ modeller 
 
Due to the difficulties of obtaining licenses for Riverbed modeler, OMNET++ was used. 
OMNET++ is an open source network simulation modeler, allowing modifications in the 
configuration files of network protocols and network devices and manages their behaviour. 
The work environment of OMNET++ is to some extent similar to the older version of 
Riverbed modeler; with the difference of OMNET requiring more knowledge of C++ 
programming language and the setup of header files and C++ libraries to utilise certain 
functions.  
This phase of the project applied AIS for BGP as MITM detection and prevention as well 
as Message Replay. The purpose of this phase was to compare AIS in the current 
modifications versus unmodified AIS, BGPsec and S-BGP.  
The criteria of the tests and evaluations were inspired by (Kim et al. 2007), Chapter 2, 
Section 2.5.2.1 (Page 89).   
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5.2.1 Tests and evaluation 
 
Using OMNET++, the modified AIS using negative selection followed by clonal 
selection algorithms (Section 3.3) were implemented on BGPv4 networks. Furthermore, for 
validation of the tests, the layout of the network was repeated three more times to gather data 
from implementing AIS negative selection on BGPv4, S-BGP and finally BGPsec. 
The criteria used to evaluate the results were inspired from Kim et al.(2007), and will be 
summarised in a table later. 
The first test to run the four different versions of BGP was speed of establishing a BGP 
session and how long it will take to restart a session with peers, Figure 65. 
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As shown in Figure 65, AIS BGP (indicated by blue line), is the fastest to restart a BGP 
session; followed by BGPsec which was represented by black line, then negative selection 
AIS (red line), then finally S-BGP which is the green line. 
The reason for the faster restart on AIS BGP could be due to the detectors being 
generated while BGP session initialising, which means that AIS is working independently 
from BGP while utilising the data gathered from other routing protocols (i.e., OSPF) and 
BGP OPEN message. Thus, identifying self-cells in the process. BGPsec being the second 
fastest to restart could be reasoned by the fact that BGPsec uses encryption provided by 
IPsec. Whereas AIS using negative selection having a slow restart and coming as third for 
speed of restarting a session is that using unmodified negative selection can be an extensive 
process to reach mature detectors. Finally, S-BGP taking the longest to restart is due to the 
dependencies that it has where each peering routers need to have PKI which requires time in 
order to obtain and release those keys. 
Further, the modified AIS on BGP and negative selection AIS were tested for end to end 
delay for all BGP messages and the results are shown in Figures 66 and 67, respectively. 
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Figure 66. Modified AIS end to end delay (X-axis is time, Y-axis is delay). 
 
Figure 67. Negative Selection AIS End to End delay (X-axis is time, Y-axis is delay). 
 
In Figure 66, the X-axis represents the time lapse, while Y-axis represents the delay in 
receiving a BGP message, both times are in seconds. According to the same figure, the 
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longest registered delay of receiving a BGP message while using modified AIS was 0.0019 
seconds at around 1.88 seconds from the beginning of BGP session. 
Whereas on the other hand, in Figure 67, the negative selection AIS recorded the longest 
delay of 0.0022 seconds at around 1.10 seconds. 
The mean of total delay for modified AIS was calculated to be 0.000855385, median to 
be 0.0008 and standard deviation to be 0.000512919. However, for negative selection AIS the 
mean of total delay for receiving BGP messages was 0.001192308, median equals 0.0012 
with a standard deviation of 0.000526909. 
Mean, Median and Standard Deviation values for AIS BGP and Negative Selection AIS 
End to End delay are illustrated in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. End to End Delay comparison for AIS BGP versus Negative Selection AIS. 
 AIS BGP Negative Selection AIS 
Mean                      
Median               
Standard Deviation                     
 
The mean of total delay in the modified AIS is lower than negative selection AIS and 
considering that the two models have very close standard deviations it can be derived that 
modified AIS has an overall lower delay compared to negative selection AIS. Furthermore, as 
the median for negative selection AIS shows a higher number, it can be concluded that the 
overall delays for BGP with negative selection AIS are higher.  
The calculations for mean, median and standard deviation are done using the equations 
listed in Appendix D. 
In order to demonstrate the delays and frequency of certain delay offsets, Figures 68 and 
69 are listed next. 
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Figure 68. Modified AIS End to End Delay Offset. 
 
Figure 69. Negative Selection AIS End to End Delay Offset. 
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From Figure 68, it can be seen that the most reoccurring delay in the modified AIS is 
0.0004s where it repeated 12 times in the total of 65 events recorded. Whereas on the other 
hand, negative selection AIS has the delay of 0.0012s as the most reoccurring with 8 
occurrences out of the total 65 events recorded shown in Figure 69.  
The final test was to calculate the accuracy of the detection systems, therefore Figure 70 
shows the false positive alerts compared to detected events recorded for each of AIS BGP, 
Negative Selection AIS, S-BGP and BGPsec. 
 
 
Figure 70. False and True Positives for Each Method Used (the original plot obtained 
from the software can be found in Appendix G). 
 
As shown in Figure 70, the modified AIS for BGP (represented by blue bar) was able to 
detect 430 events of total 455 with 25 false positives (light blue bar). Precision rate of 
detection was calculated by Equation 7; making AIS BGP to have 94.505% precision rate. 
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Equation 7. IDS precision rate. 
           
             
(                            )
      
  
 
Whereas for Negative Selection AIS (red bar), 360 events detected out of 455 total while 
having 95 false positive alerts (pink bar), making the precision rate for detection being 
79.121%.  
Consequently, S-BGP (green bar) and BGPsec (orange bar) are recoded to have 100% 
detection as they both operate in different manner where they rely on encryption to provide 
security for BGP rather than misuse or anomaly detection of events in the network.  
Finally, a comparison amongst the four different versions of BGP is set against the list of 
criteria suggested by Kim et al. (2007), as shown in table 10. 
 
Table 10. (Kim et al. 2007) IDS criteria comparison for Negative Selection AIS, S-
BGP, BGPsec and modified AIS BGP. 
 Negative selection 
AIS 
S-BGP BGPsec AIS BGP 
Configurability Yes No No Yes 
Extendibility Yes Yes, but require 
PKI 
Yes Yes 
Scalability Yes No No Yes 
Adaptability No Yes Yes Yes 
Global Analysis No No No Yes 
Efficiency No No Yes Yes 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work 
 
This chapter includes the conclusion and future work sections.  The conclusion section is 
summarising the main stages of this project answering the main research question that is: 
 
In order to answer the aforementioned research question, a set of aims are suggested. 
These aims are listed below: 
1. Authenticate the address of the sender of BGP packets by using AIS to detect MITM 
attack by utilising network topology mapping via adjacent routers’ address versus AS 
path variable in the packets.  
2. Prevent MITM attacks in BGP networks using AIS, by registering triggered attacks in 
records, thus preventing a malicious packet from being processed. 
3. Verify BGP packet content using AIS to detect Message Replay attack, by registering 
false positive advertisement of packets (as discussed in chapter 3).  
4. Prevent Message Replay attacks in BGP networks using AIS to record the sender’s 
details versus the message contents. 
5. Remap BGP networks to avoid passage of messages and network communications 
through suspected network nodes. 
On the other hand, the future work section is discussing the possible improvements on 
this project to tackle different problem scope.  
  
How can AIS improve the security for BGPv4 with respect to authentication and 
verification? 




This thesis is focused on studying AIS ability to improve the BGP security. Since BGP is 
the only protocol that is capable of providing communications between different ASes; it has 
been vulnerable to different attacks as they grow in number and sophistication over time.  
Researchers invested their efforts to improve the security of different aspects of BGP to 
withstand certain types of attacks; although most suggested solutions were lacking the 
adaptability to minimise the administrative interaction. Moreover, security implementations 
usually tend to have a trade-off for aspects of financial resources needed to implement, level 
of security offered, and over all, the speed of operation of the protocol. 
Therefore, the contribution to knowledge is to provide a security mechanism that can 
offer scalability to cope with BGP networks expansion, adaptability to minimise requiring 
human interactions in minor incidents, economical in order to be implemented on different 
vendors’ equipment without the need of involving third party for issuing encryption keys, and 
finally to not have an effect on the speed of packets transmission.  
On the other hand, Machine Learning research field was found to be fitting the need to 
minimise the human interaction to resolve issues between ASes since Machine Learning 
relies on analysing the received data and taking a decision based on the analysis outcome. 
Therefore, studying the implementation of Machine Learning mechanism to BGP was an 
attractive research field.  
Inspired from natural immune system this research suggests Artificial Immune System to 
facilitate machine learning to detect packets anomalies (specifically MITM and Message 
Replay). After modifying the originally stated AIS algorithms (negative and clonal 
selections), AIS is able to be used in BGP environment. Through the course of simulation 
using Riverbed Modeler, it was found that AIS is capable of detecting MITM and Message 
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Replay by analysing the data of the packet sender and the packet content (satisfying aim one 
and three); with the aid of random number generation, these attacks were randomly triggered. 
As shown in the results chapter (chapter 5), it is highlighted that the speed of packet 
transmission is barely affected by the implementation of AIS when compared to the normal 
BGP transmission speed. That is due to isolating the AIS processing node from that of BGP, 
allowing AIS to work in parallel to BGP. Whereas on the other hand, if AIS was residing 
inside BGP processing node, it would have had more delays as it adds queuing processing 
time thus delaying the transmission.  
Another aspect to indicate a successful impact of AIS on the security of BGP is the 
detection of malicious packets and identifying the suspicious source of these packets leading 
to taking a decision to remap the network topology avoiding the malicious nodes (achieving 
aim two, four and five). 
Furthermore, OMNET++ was utilised in order to apply the modified AIS on BGP 
network and comparing that against Negative Selection AIS, S-BGP and BGPsec. Inspired by 
Kim et al. (2007), the criteria for comparison amongst the four different BGP networks were 
set. The observations from the gathered results show that Modified AIS outperforms 
Negative Selection AIS with regards to false positives rate and accuracy. Whereas on the 
other hand, S-BGP and BGPsec showed no false positives that is due to the fact that these 
two protocol versions rely on encryption rather than intrusion detection. Therefore, another 
comparison criteria (session restart) were set to evaluate the performance of the four 
prototypes. It could be observed from the gathered results that Modified AIS had the fastest 
session restart followed by BGPsec, Negative Selection AIS and S-BGP. The reason for this 
observation could be that Modified AIS works in parallel with BGP session initialisation 
relying on data obtained from intra domain routing protocols e.g., RIP or OSPF. 
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6.2 Future Work 
 
This research was designed for multi-homed router where a router having multiple 
connections to receive data from. Therefore, as future work based on this project could 
include modifications on AIS algorithm to be used for terminal routers where a router having 
one connection to send/receive data from, in order to satisfy the different scenarios of router 
placement in network topology. 
Another possible future work is to include other types of attacks such as DoS, “BGP 
wedgie”, route flap damping, as well as other attacks that are achieved indirectly by attacking 
TCP aiming to disrupt the active sessions of BGP. Covering more security breaches or node 
misbehaviour could help in improving the overall security level thus enhancing the global 
network’s infrastructure with minimum administrative efforts.   
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Appendix C 
Evolution of Border Gateway Protocol 
This part shows the difference of the four versions of BGP.   
 
Table 11. Comparison between the four versions of BGP. 
 BGPv1 BGPv2 BGPv3 BGPv4 
Hold Time It includes the 
number of seconds 
that could elapse 
between iterating 
Update of Keepalive 
messages; it is 
placed in the Header 
of every message. 
Performing the same 
functionality but it 
was replaced into the 
OPEN message. 
No further change. No further change. 
SuperNetting Not been suggested. Not been suggested. Not been suggested. In the UPDATE 
message, it allows the 
router to use CIDR for 
IP addresses. 
IP Prefix Not been suggested. Not been suggested. Not been suggested. In the UPDATE 
message, this feature 
allows the BGP 
compliant device to 
include multiple 
destinations using one IP 
Prefix. 
Next Hop In the UPDATE 
message, this field 
was named 
GATEWAY, and 
includes the IP 
address of the border 
router of that AS. 
In this field it was 
renamed to Next 
Hop, and changed to 




Added flexibility to 
accept IP address of 
border routers in 
another AS. 
No further change. 
Identifier Not been suggested. Not been suggested. In the OPEN 
message, this field 
works on avoiding 
possible collisions 
by tagging the IP 
address of a specific 
interface on the 
sender router. 
No further change. 
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direction that the 
message should 
follow. 
Removed from the 
protocol. 
Removed from the 
protocol. 
Removed from the 
protocol. 
Version In the HEADER, 
works on identifying 
the version of the 
protocol of the 
sender. 
Replaced into the 
OPEN message, 
performing the same 
functionality. 
No further change. No further change. 
OPEN Confirm 
message 
As a response to 
confirm the receipt 





No further change. No further change. 
Marker EGIHT bytes in the 
message HEADER, 
works on confirming 
the synchronisation 
of both peers if set to 
all ones. 





peers, it could be 
used as BGP 
authentication 
technique. 
No further change. No further change. 
UPDATE 
message 




Path attributes added 
along with the type 
code; in addition to 
the main 
functionality. 
Adding flexibility to 
the NEXT HOP 
field. 
Could use Supernetting/ 
CIDR to reach multiple 
destinations in one IP 
prefix; in addition to 
adding more path 
attributes e.g. 
Aggregator, Atomic 
Aggregate,  Local 
Preference and M.E.D. 
 
  




OPNET modeler version: 15.6 
Omnet++ modeler version: 5.6.2 
Network topology design shown in Figure 71. 
 
 
Figure 71. Network Topology. 
 
Each router in the network is sharing the same configuration as shown in Figure 72. 
 
160 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 72. Routers’ coding blocks. 
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Figure 73. BGP finite state. 
 
The Red machine states are conditional (whenever a failure occurs or initialisation of 
variables). The node that concerned the modifications is Receive node (the one selected in the 
figure above). 
For each of these finite machine states, there are two main areas of coding, the upper section 
is the code that would be implemented upon entering this finite state, whereas the lower part 
is executed upon exiting the state.  































If (num_pkts > 0) 
Received_pkptr = op_pk_get (op_intrpt_strm ()); 
Op_pk_nfd_get (received_pkptr, “type”, &received_packet_type); 
Intrpt_info.msg_pkptr = received_pkptr; 
Intrpt_info.msg_type = received_packet_type; 
If (Bgp_Packet_Type_Update == received_packet_type) 
{ 
Op_pk_send_forced (received_pkptr, 1); 
Received_pkptr = op_pk_get (1); 
} 
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The highlighted section of the code works on sending the packets to AIS processing node that 
is attached to BGP processing node, though only when the packet type is UPDATE message 
only since that is the scope of this project.  
On the other hand, AIS processing node is consisting of the following finite states, Figure 74.  
 
Figure 74. AIS finite state. 
In the AIS node, there are no need to set any initial values in the idle state, therefore only the 
processing node that is on the right side of the figure above is requiring programming, and 
the code is provided below: 
  





























Struct Custom_DS *ds_ptr; // pointer for previously created detectors of AIS 
Char format; 




Char three [200]; 
}; 
Struct My_path_Attr *ds_ptr; 
Pkptr = op_pk_get (op_intrpt_strm()); // extracting packet’s data 
Op_pk_fd_access_ptr (pkptr, 6, (void**) &ds_ptr); // confirming no duplicate 
message contents or flagged sender’s address. 
Num = My_Conn_Info_Ptr->neighbour_as_number; // confirming the source 
address from neighbours. 
Printf (“BGP Format Received: %s\n” , path_seg ->segment_value_array); 
Format = (char) as_path_list_ptr; // checking AS_Path attribute against analysed 
topology. 
 































Op_pk_fd_print_proc_set (pkptr, 6,OPC_PK_FD_PROPERTY_DEF_VAL_STR, 
&ptr); 
Op_pk_print_options (pkptr, OPC_PK_PRINT_ALL); 
Op_pk_nfd_gets(pkptr, “Path Attributes”, &my); 
Op_pk_print(my); 
If (pkptr == ds_ptr ) 
{ 
Pkptr = null; // discarding packet 




Op_pk_fd_get_ptr (pkptr, 5, (void **)&ds_ptr); // updating detectors 
Op_pk_print (ds_ptr); 
Printf (“BGP Format Received: %s\n”, &ds_ptr); 
} 
Op_pk_format (pkptr, format); 
Op_pk_send_quiet (pkptr,0); // sending the packets back to BGP node after being 
recognised as safe 
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The default parameters set for the routers in the network are given in Table 12 below. 
 
Table 12. Network Parameters. 
Name Status Address Subnet Mask 
AS1239_Rtr1 Active 192.0.30.1 255.255.255.0 
AS1239_Rtr2 Active 192.0.30.2 255.255.255.0 
AS4200_Rtr1 Active 192.0.18.1 255.255.255.0 
AS4200_Rtr2 Active 192.0.18.6 255.255.255.0 
AS4200_Rtr3 Active 192.0.18.2 255.255.255.0 
AS3561_Rtr1 Active 192.0.14.1 255.255.255.0 
AS3561_Rtr2 Active 192.0.14.2 255.255.255.0 
Corp C Active 192.0.21.1 (-254) 255.255.255.0 
Corp B Active 192.0.22.1 (-254) 255.255.255.0 
Corp A Active 192.0.23.1 (-254) 255.255.255.0 
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Appendix G 
 
 
